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Abstract
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Liquidity and solvency have been called the “heavenly 
twins” of banking (Goodhart, Charles, ‘Liquidity Risk 
Management’, Financial Stability Review—Special Issue 
on Liquidity, Banque de France, No. 11, February, 
2008). Since these “twins” interact in complex ways, it 
is difficult—particularly at times of crisis--to distinguish 
between them, especially in the presence of information 
asymmetries (Information asymmetry occurs when one 
party has more or better information than the other, 
creating an imbalance of power, giving rise to adverse 
selection and moral hazard). An insolvent bank can be 
liquid or illiquid, and a solvent bank may be at times 
illiquid. In the latter case, insolvency is not far away, since 
banking is grounded in information and confidence, and 
it is confidence which in the end determines liquidity. 
In other words, liquidity is very much endogenous, 
determined by the general condition of a bank, as 
well as the perception of it by the public and market 
participants. 
This paper was written by F. Montes-Negret, Director of the  Finance & Private Sector Department (ECSPF) in the Europe 
& Central Asia (ECA) Region of the World Bank. Although the paper reflects the author’s views, it is part of a larger 
effort in the Department to enhance the quality of its financial sector work, its crisis monitoring efforts, and quality of the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at:  fmontesnegret@worldbank.org. 
  Dealing with liquidity risk is more challenging than 
dealing with other risks, since liquidity is the result of 
all the operations of a bank and it is fundamentally a 
relative concept which compares segments of the balance 
sheet on the asset and liability sides. It does not deal 
with absolutes, like arguably the concept of capital and 
it explains why there is not an internationally recognized 
“Liquidity Accord”.
  This Working Paper addresses key concepts like market 
and funding liquidity and basic tools to address liquidity 
issues like cash flows, liquidity gaps and some selected 
financial ratios. It aims at providing an introductory 
guide to risk assessment and management, and provides 
useful and practical guidelines to undertake liquidity 
assessments which could prove useful in preparing 
Financial Assessment Programs (FSAPS) in member 
countries of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
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“There is not such a thing as a safe bank, even if its assets are sound, in the sense that they 
would cover all obligations if held to maturity. Any highly leveraged entity that borrows short 
and lends long and illiquid is vulnerable to speculative attack (run). A withdrawal of deposits, 
refusal to renew credit or inability to sell assets could force a bank into insolvency even it its 
assets were good, provided they could be held to maturity. 
 
A viable banking system therefore requires a central bank that can act as lender of last resort 
(to offer support against funding illiquidity) and market maker of last resort (to offer support 





“Iceland’s bank defaults: lessons of a death foretold” 
FT.com/maverecon, October 9, 2008  
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION:  MOTIVATION & DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
 
1.  Liquidity and solvency have been called the “heavenly twins” of banking.
1 Since these 
“twins” interact in complex ways, it is difficult—particularly at times of crisis—to distinguish 
between them, especially in the presence of information asymmetries
2. An insolvent bank can 
be liquid or illiquid, and a solvent bank may be at times illiquid. In the latter case, insolvency is 
not far away, since banking is grounded in information and confidence, and it is confidence 
which in the end determines liquidity. In other words, liquidity is very much endogenous, 
determined by the general condition of a bank, as well as the perception of it by the public and 
market participants. 
 
2.  Illiquidity and insolvency  are not interchangeable terms but very different, although 
related, concepts. From an accounting point of view, a bank is balance sheet insolvent when its 
total liabilities exceed its total assets (negative net assets) and, therefore, it has no option but to 
default on some obligations, leading the bank into receivership, intervention or bankruptcy. On 
the other hand, a bank is illiquid when it has a specific liquidity problem or experiences a 
liquidity crisis and it cannot obtain the funding needed, in a timely form, at market prices, to 
meet its obligations when due. Thus, insolvency reflects a structural and stock financial 
problem, while illiquidity refers to a point in time cashflow and pricing problem. One major 
issue for creditors, central banks and supervisors is that it is difficult to know if a bank is 
illiquid because it is insolvent or not. Moreover, illiquidity could also rapidly lead into 
insolvency if the problem is not addressed quickly and effectively in order to reassure 
depositors and other creditors.  
 
3.  Why is it important to make the difference between these two terms clear? The 
difference is important because policy actions to address a liquidity or insolvency crisis vary 
dramatically and, therefore, assessing the underlying problems of banks becomes crucial. 
Insolvency applies to individual banks or to systemic problems. In the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, the underlying problem of some financial intermediaries heavily invested in sub-prime 
mortgages was a solvency problem, which was also translated into a liquidity crisis in view of 
the uncertainty about asset values and counterparty risks which raised, dramatically, market 
liquidity risks. Some banks were highly leveraged (often through ‘off-balance’ sheet special 
purpose vehicles—SPVs—structured investment vehicles—SIVs—or conduits), having 
securitized products which defaulted, creating not only a structural solvency problem (for the 
SPVs) but also a liquidity crisis for the bank as some of these vehicles required additional 
liquidity support. The large “shadow” banking system in the form of off-balance sheet vehicles 
posed extraordinary liquidity demands on banks at the worst possible time. Some of these 
transactions were financing long term, low quality credit with short-term funds, at a time when 
market liquidity was abundant and continuous refinancing was possible. Once liquidity 
tightened and even started to freeze, and market liquidity risk skyrocketed, participants started 
                                                 
1 Goodhart, Charles, ‘Liquidity Risk Management’, Financial Stability Review -- Special Issue on Liquidity, 
Banque de France, No. 11, February, 2008. 
2 Information asymmetry occurs when one party has more or better information than the other, creating an 
imbalance of power, giving rise to adverse selection and moral hazard.  
 
to hoard cash, making even solvent banks become illiquid overnight.
3 It should be noted that 
precautionary hoarding increases when the likelihood of liquidity shocks rises and market funds 
are more difficult to obtain, triggering a liquidity spiral and often cross-bank contagion.
4 
 
4.  Clearly, the concept of liquidity is critical for the operation of banks in good and, even 
more so, in bad times, when they might face more limited access options (higher market 
liquidity risk) and become more dependent on central bank liquidity support. Paradoxically, 
prior to the present crisis the theme of liquidity management has received limited attention from 
both international bodies (there is no ‘Liquidity Accord’ under the auspices of the Basel 
Committee) and in the IMF/WB Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAPs), where there is 
some limited attention focused on the lender of last resort (LOLR) facilities of central banks 
and payment and securities settlement systems (under the rather misleading heading of 
“systemic liquidity infrastructure”).
5 Even in the stress-testing undertaken in FSAPs, the issue 
of liquidity does not receive enough attention. This Working Paper aims at flagging some of the 
critical issues in this area to provide practical guidance on how to approach liquidity issues in 
FSAPs and other Bank/IMF work, synthesizing practical approaches from a wide number of 
sources.  
 
5.  Why has liquidity risk become more critical? There are two inter-related fundamental 
reasons: (i) a change in the traditional banking intermediation model; and (ii) increased 
competition. Historically, banks relied on stable and low-cost core deposits (demand, savings 
and time deposits) as the primary source of funding to generate a portfolio of (rather illiquid) 
loans held to maturity. So there is a fundamental risk, as banks are in general structurally 
illiquid. However, as long as liquid assets (LA) were sufficient in relation to more volatile 
liquid liabilities (LL), that is LA>LL, banks would in normal circumstances be fine (i.e.; 
liquid). More recently the availability of alternative investments and savings products offered 
by a wider variety of financial institutions has made the banks’ traditional funding base smaller, 
less predictable (i.e.; more volatile) and more costly. The adoption of an ‘originate and sell’ 
banking intermediation model, known as a securitized model, has induced banks to rely more 
and more on price and credit sensitive market funding, in general increasing the share of 
wholesale funding in total banking funds on the liability side, and the reliance on securitization 
markets on the asset side. What is really new about this crisis compared with other is the extent 
of (complete and incomplete) securitization.
6 The increased competition from other banks and 
non-bank financial institutions, as well by securities markets, has put additional pressure on 
banks’ net interest margins and has driven them to optimize liquidity management, resulting in 
a secular decline (see below) in lower-yielding, on balance sheet, liquid assets. The search for 
yield (rising returns on assets ROA- and return on equity—ROE) by shareholders and bank 
managers in more competitive markets induced banks to increase their leverage and take more 
                                                 
3 Roubini, R. ‘Worse than LTCM: Not just a liquidity crisis; rather a credit crisis crunch’, RGE Monitor, August 
2007 
4  See Markus K. Brunnermier, “Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and Credit Crunch”,  Mimeo, Princeton 
University, May 19, 2008. 
5 WB-IMF, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook, 2005. 
6 By incomplete securitizations I mean that the selling bank still retained the liquidity risk from maturity 
transformations. As observed in the present crisis, even when the securitization was complete (i.e.; risks were fully 
off-loaded from the bank’s balance sheet), for reputational reasons and not always for legal reasons banks provided 
backstop liquidity facilities and credit lines. See Brunnermeier, op.cit., page 27.  
 
risk—including higher liquidity risks, by increasing the illiquid portion of their assets through 
more lending or relying excessively in the permanence of market liquidity to securitize loans on 
demand. As we know “linear thinking” can be quite dangerous! While the sources of funding 
have diversified, the dependence on market funding has also gone up and the margin for error 
has been reduced. At the core of the present financial crisis there was the concept of abundant 
and uninterrupted availability of market liquidity. In the aftermath of the current crisis, both the 
banking system and regulators are struggling to devise more prudent approaches to liquidity 
management, including the likely adoption of mandatory controversial liquidity buffers. 
 
A.  Cashflow is King 
 
6.  Liquidity is defined as the ability to obtain cash for operations when needed at a 
reasonable cost. The liquidity needs of a bank result from its net cashflow projections--covering 
expected cash inflows and outflows and expected capacity to fill funding gaps, broken down by 
major business lines, instruments and maturity buckets in different currencies. As stressed by 
some supervisory agencies, given the uncertainties involved in calculating cashflows, a 
conservative bias seems appropriate in calculating such estimates, assigning later dates to cash 
inflows and earlier dates to cash outflows (OSFI).  
 
7.  Moreover, both these types of cashflow projections should be made: (i) under ‘business 
as usual’ assumptions, and (ii) under stressed conditions.
7 Banks might be confronted with 
liquidity risks as a result of their own internal shortcomings (‘idiosyncratic stress’) or they 
might be affected by systemic liquidity problems affecting all banks (’market wide stress’). It is 
not easy to distinguish between idiosyncratic and systemic liquidity problems at a given point 
in time. Systemic issues will affect all banks’ financial performance and even their viability in 
case markets become completely illiquid. In the latter case banks are confronted with market 
liquidity risks, which might force them to go to the lender of last resort.  
 
8.  This stress-testing exercise is critical, since it is always the case that commercial banks 
die when their treasuries collapse. Bank treasuries synthesize all the operations of banks in 
terms of cash flows from asset and liability transactions (on and off balance sheet) in domestic 
and foreign currencies. Once liquid assets fall below immediate callable demands on a bank’s 
liability side (an immediate liquidity gap), alarms go off and bank managers must take 
immediate action to correct the imbalance, raising enough funds to fill the gap, otherwise the 
bank will fail to honor its payments. It might be the case that it is not poor asset and liability 
management (ALM) per se which causes illiquidity, but problems in other parts of the bank, 
including the bank’s trading or credit portfolios which may trigger a loss of confidence in the 
name of the bank (often referred to as ‘name crisis’) or eventual operational risks. It is worth 
repeating that an individual bank faces a ‘liquidity risk’ – beyond normal funding problems -
when it cannot obtain the next unit of funding at current market interest rates. So, it is not 
simply a matter of the bank obtaining the required funds at ‘distressed’ prices; it should be able 
to obtain them under normal market conditions.   
                                                 
7 Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), ‘Consultation Paper on Liquidity Buffers & Survival 
Periods’, July, 2009.  
 
9.  To summarize, there are three liquidity nodes: funding liquidity by banks, by markets, 
and by the central bank as a last resort (see Chart 1 below).
8 
 
Chart 1: Liquidity Nodes of the Financial System 
 
 
Source: Nikolau [check] 
 
10.  The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision defines funding liquidity as the ability of 
banks to meet their liabilities, or unwind or settle their positions as they come due.
9 
Alternatively, funding liquidity is the ability of banks to meet their obligations at a reasonable 
cost when they come due
10. Consequently, funding liquidity risk is the probability of being 
unable to service a bank’s liabilities immediately. Funding liquidity is a point in time concept, 
while funding liquidity risk is a forward looking term
11--the latter measures the likelihood in a 
time horizon, not at a specific point of time, of not being able to settle obligations when due. 
 
11.  Market liquidity is defined as the ability to trade an asset at short notice, at low cost and 
with little impact on price.
12 Other analysts
13 decompose market liquidity in three sub-
components measured by: (i) the bid-ask spread; (ii) market depth in terms of the price 
elasticity to a given volume of security sales; and (iii) market resiliency (time for a temporary 
drop in price to bounce back).  
 
12.  Finally, central banks, in the normal course of business, provide liquidity to the market 
to smooth fluctuations, seasonal or otherwise, but they also play the function of lenders of last 
resort, that is, extending credit to solvent banks when no one else will.  
 
                                                 
8 Nikolaou, K., ‘Liquidity (Risk) Concepts, Definitions and Interactions’, ECB, Working Paper Series, No.1008, 
February, 2009. 
9 BIS, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Liquidity Risk: Management and Supervisory Challenges’, 
2008. 
10 Nikolaou, ‘Liquidity (risk) concepts definitions and interactions’, European Central Bank, February 2009 
11 Drehmann and Nikolau, ‘Funding liquidity risk definition and measurement’, European Central Bank, March 
2009 
12 ECB, op. cit., page, 14. 
13 Kyle, A.S., “Continuous auctions and insider trading”, Econometrica 53, pages 1315-1335, 1985. Quoted by 
Brunnermeier, op. cit., page 23.  
 
13.  Clearly there are strong dynamic dependencies and complementarities between market 
and funding liquidity as illustrated in the diagram below (Committee of European Banking 







14.  As illustrated in the above diagram, “attempts to sell significant amounts of less liquid 
assets may prompt (further) market illiquidity (channel 1 in the diagram), leaving the institution 
unable to raise the amount that it originally planned. A funding need can also arise from market 
illiquidity (channel 2), for example when an institution is unable to securitize or syndicate 
loans. In the case of fire sales, it may also incur losses, placing pressure on earnings and capital. 
If an institution is unable to securitize or syndicate loans, its balance sheet size will increase, 
resulting in capital pressure. The deterioration in credit quality may also constrain the 
institution’s access to funding markets (reinforcing channel 2). 
 
15.  The actions of the institution can also have negative externalities (contagion). Its 
attempts to sell assets can reduce general market liquidity, placing other institutions under 
liquidity pressure, even though they may have suffered no significant first order losses. And the 
fall in market prices caused by “fire sales” can place other institutions under earnings and 
capital pressures. These institutions will then have liquidity needs of their own (channel 3), 
with their asset sales to meet their funding needs creating a potential feedback loop to market 
illiquidity (channel 4). Institutions that suffer large liquidity shortfalls may seek to close out  
 
lending positions, particularly in the inter-bank market. These actions create direct funding 
liquidity needs at other market participants (channel 5)”.
14  
 
16.  Banks might organize their global liquidity management in different ways but, in 
general, they can opt for a completely centralized approach with the head office managing 
liquidity for the whole company in every currency. Alternatively, they could follow a 
decentralized model where operating units are assigned responsibilities for managing their own 
liquidity, subject to centrally set limits and frequent reporting to the head office. Using a 
different approach, the bank could also decide to centrally manage liquidity in the home 
currency while foreign subsidiaries or branches manage their liquidity in the currencies in 
which they operate.
15 Irrespective of the liquidity management model adopted, information 
must be readily available and current, supported by adequate Management Information Systems 
(MIS) for Sr. Managers and their Boards of Directors.
16 
 
17.  One of the lessons of the present financial crisis is the importance of paying enhanced 
attention to liquidity issues. As mentioned in the latest BIS Annual Report: 
 
“The crisis revealed once more that this view [substitutability between market and institutional financing] 
does not emphasize sufficiently the strong interdependencies between on-balance sheet and market-based 
intermediation. Institutions depend on markets for revenue generation, risk management and funding, 
while market functioning depends on institutions to provide market-making services, securities 
underwriting and lines of credit. These interdependencies between markets and institutions were 
showcased by the difficulties that institutions faced in funding their operations in illiquid markets and the 
problems created in the functioning of markets when the participating institutions were under stress. 
Heightened concern about counterparty risk led to a seizing-up of markets and undermined the liquidity of 
portfolios and firms’ funding strategies, causing large losses. An important message from the crisis is that 
the stability of both channels of financial intermediation is supported by a common capital base.” Large 
financial firms play an important role in both the on-balance sheet and market-based intermediation 
channels.
17 Such interaction between large financial institutions and markets gives rise to some 
externalities, including those resulting from liquidity shocks. 
 
Ensuring financial stability means addressing externalities—costs that, through its actions, an institution 
imposes on others but does not bear itself. Two externalities are central to systemic risk: the first is joint 
failures of institutions resulting from their common exposures at a single point in time—common 
exposures because of shocks that come from outside the financial system or because of linkages among 
intermediaries. The shocks may take a variety of forms, including both credit and liquidity shocks and 
their interaction, while the linkages arise from the complex web of daily transactions. The second 
externality is what has come to be known as pro-cyclicality, the fact that, over time, the dynamics of the 
financial system and of the real economy reinforce each other, increasing the amplitude of booms and 
busts and undermining stability in both the financial sector and the real economy. Properly designed, each 
component of the framework—focusing on instruments, markets and institutions—can mitigate these 
sources of instability”.
18  
                                                 
14 CEBS, ‘Second part of CEBS’S Technical Advice to the European Commission on Liquidity Risk 
Management”, June 17, 2008, pages 23-24. 
15 OSFI Canada, ‘Guideline” (B-6) on the Subject of Liquidity’, December, 1995. 
16 The complexity of the bank will have a bearing on the design of the liquidity management system and tools used 
by each bank. There also implications for the management of collateral (encumbered or unencumbered) and across 
jurisdictions, which could prevent the quick sale or cross-border transfer of assets. More later.  
17 BIS, Annual Report 2009, page 51. 
18 BIS Annual Report 2009, page 125.   
 
18.  Adequate policy responses, including emergency liquidity provisions by central banks, 
helped to solve the liquidity crisis but not the structural insolvency problem (as discussed in 
Box 1  
 
Box 1: ‘Central Bank as the lender of last resort’ 
 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis exposed the scale of actions that central banks can implement in their function as 
‘lenders of last resort’. In this role, central banks have at their disposal a variety of tools that should be tailored to 
address each type of liquidity shortage
1. 
The historical (Bagehot) argument
2 regarding central bank interventions states that central banks should lend to 
solvent banks without limit, against good collateral, at penalty rates. In recent literature
3, the role of central banks 
is specified as: 
- Guarantors of the entire economy and therefore having the capacity to tackle systemic liquidity risks. They 
are thus charged with preventing panic-induced collapses of the banking systems and minimizing the costs of 
bank runs. 
- Shock absorbers, but not shock avoiders--by minimizing the secondary repercussions of shocks, averting 
contagion, spillover or domino effects. Thus, central bank interventions should be restricted to providing 
temporary liquidity, aimed at breaking the loop between market and funding liquidity risks.  
- Temporary supporters of the financial systems, until the structural causes of liquidity risk can be dealt with. 
This is a very important argument, stressed by Roubini
4.  
Central bank liquidity interventions can act as a buffer against liquidity risk-- to halt the vicious circle between 
funding and market liquidity--but they cannot resolve banking insolvency (Though in some countries they have 
attempted to use long term funding  by central bank as de facto capital/solvency support). Insolvency and credit 
crises lead to financial and economic distress that cannot be resolved just with liquidity injections by the LOLR. 
Moreover, in some jurisdictions (for example, Canada) central banks require a ‘solvency opinion’ by the 
supervisory agency prior to giving banks access to the LOLR facilities. Almost all central banks require a 
determination of solvency prior to giving access to the LOLR facilities. This determination is required from a third 
party when there is a separate banking supervisor. Due to asymmetric information, it is difficult for central banks 
to distinguish between insolvency and illiquidity and this can lead to adverse selection in lending. By rescuing 
undeserving institutions (insolvent banks), the central bank can be implicitly penalizing solvent but illiquid banks 
because it would increase their cost of funding.  
Consequently, the main risk of central bank interventions is moral hazard. Providing liquidity during a credit crisis 
can induce moral hazard as it creates expectations of investors’ bailouts. Moreover, a misallocation of central bank 
liquidity can promote excessive risk-taking by banks and stimulate risk prone behavior by insolvent banks 
(‘gambling for resurrection’). For these reasons, in a financial crisis, effective supervision and regulation are the 
fundamental weapons against systemic risks. They can help central banks discern between illiquid and insolvent 
banks and can directly act against the causes of liquidity risk. 
 
1/ Ceccchetti and Disyatat, Central Bank Tools and Liquidity Shortages, Bank for International Settlements, 
February 2009. 
2/ Bagehot, Lombard street: A description of the money market, 1873. 
3/ Nikolaou, Liquidity (risk) concepts definitions and interactions, European Central Bank, February 2009 




B.  Liquidity Gaps 
 
19.  One of the main functions of banks is to provide “term-transformation” services to the 
economy, by taking shorter-term liabilities and transforming them into longer-term (not easy to 
trade) assets. However, this poses, by definition, liquidity and rollover risks (the risk that the 
depositors do not rollover their deposits) and, therefore, funding liquidity risk
19. These risks are 
addressed by banks funding from one or more of the three pillars or nodes of liquidity discussed 
earlier. The funding liquidity risk can be minimized by holding liquid assets. But liquid assets 
generate no returns (cash assets) or low/lower returns (government securities) since they are 
riskless or low risk assets, as opposed to longer term (private) assets (loans and investments) 
which are more illiquid, riskier but yield higher returns. Banks always face a trade-off between 
holding liquid assets and using them to provide a liquidity cushion, or investing in less liquid 
but higher return longer term assets. These financial incentives have, over the past five decades, 
caused banks to dramatically reduce the share of liquid assets in total bank assets, drastically 
decreasing the margin of error. According to Goodhart (see Footnote 1), in the 1950s, British 
clearing banks typically held 30 percent of their total assets in very liquid form (treasury bonds 
and short-term government debt), while now they keep only one percent! 
 
20.  There are trade-offs between higher short-term earnings and prudent liquidity risk 
management. During ‘good times’, such trade-offs are often forgotten but they become too 
evident when the business cycle turns or market disruptions make it more difficult and costly to 
tap several potential sources of funding, including market funding sources (ex. Inter-bank lines 
of credit), or attract or retain deposits. Clearly, there are trade-offs between liquidity risks and 
banks’ profitability. Liquidity risk is certainly a major consequential risk—as many failed 
banks can attest—but it is also true that banks cannot afford to maintain enough excess liquidity 
to survive every conceivable worst case scenario.  
 
21.  Keeping in mind the structure of a bank’s balance sheet is important for understanding 
that liquidity gaps are intrinsic to the banking business, and funding liquidity risk is an 
endogenous factor that makes banks quite fragile. For this reason, risk and liquidity 
management are pivotal not only to the survival of individual banks but also to the stability of 
financial systems. Given these structural features, it is somewhat surprising that regulators pay 
more attention to capital than to liquidity. However, when examiners evaluate a bank’s 
liquidity, they focus their attention on the bank’s ability to generate funds at a reasonable cost 
to fund its operations. The point is that having access to funding, per se, is not indicative of a 
strong liquidity position.
20 Clearly, the analysis of a bank’s liquidity is complex since it is, as 
indicated above, a summary result of all its cashflow operations and it is a relative concept: 
availability of more liquid assets than liquid liabilities likely to leave the bank at a point in time. 
 
22.  As illustrated in Chart 3 below, when a bank has longer-term commitments compared to 
shorter-term deposits, immediate and future deficits occur, generating liquidity gaps which 
must be financed. The latter are more formally defined as the “projected differences between 
asset and liability time profiles”.
21 This analysis creates “buckets” of excesses (banks can lend 
                                                 
19 Jenkinson, “Containing system-wide liquidity risks: some issues and challenges”, Bank of England,  May 2009 
20 FDIC, ‘Director’s Corner’, San Francisco Region Director’s College Computer Based Training:  Liquidity. 
21 Bessis, Risk Management in Banking, page 136.  
 
excess liquidity) or deficits (banks must borrow) of liquidity for different time periods. As a 
result of the intrinsic fragility of banks, some safety net arrangements have been put in place to 
increase the public’s confidence in the banks, particularly through the establishment of a safety 
net comprising access to the LOLR and to deposit insurance schemes protecting insured 
deposits up to prescribed limits. 
 
Chart 3: Liquidity Gaps 
 
Source: Bessis, Joel: Risk Management in Banking, Second Edition, 2002, Page 140 
 
23.  Liquidity gaps can be static (based on existing assets and liabilities) or dynamic (when 
the planned lending and borrowing activities are included), both giving rise to interest rate risk 
in fixed rate environments (more below). 
 
C.  Funding Liquidity risk 
 
24.  Funding liquidity risk is viewed as an endemic risk of the financial system
22. A bank, 
per se, is subject to liquidity risk; it is in its own nature to assume the possibility of funding 
liquidity risk due to the maturity mismatch of its assets and liabilities
23.  For the above reasons, 
analyzing funding requirements is critical, involving the construction of what is known as a 
‘maturity ladder’ and the estimation of a cumulative excess or deficit of funds at selected 
maturity dates. In examining future expected cashflows, it is critical to distinguish between 
contractual and behavioral  assumptions. In principle, assets or liabilities classified in the 
former category, and their corresponding in/out cashflows, should be more predictable. 
Behavioral assumptions must clearly distinguish between different price and credit quality 
                                                 
22 Nikolaou, page 9 
23 It is further explained bellow in ‘Liquidity gaps’  
 
sensitivities. In general, wholesale funds are more credit-risk and interest rate sensitive hence 
more volatile than retail deposits but things can rapidly change if confidence is lost. 
 
25.  A critical aspect in liquidity risk management is the time horizon to be considered. 
Some supervisory agencies advice banks to consider two phases in determining the relevant 
time period (CEBS): (i) a short acute phase of stress (example, one to two weeks); and (ii) a 
longer period of less acute but more persistent stress (example, one to two months).
24 In other 
jurisdictions, banks must prepare detailed ‘funds flow analysis’ (for example, in the US). 
Beyond these time horizons, banks are normally required by supervisors to develop ‘what if’ 
scenarios (“scenario testing” by OSFI in Canada and “contingency funding plans” by the OCC 
in the US). This point is discussed in detail further down. An illustrative format for cashflow 
projections of up to three and six months from CEBS is shown in Charts 4 and 5.  
 





                                                 
24  CEBS, page 13  
 





D.  Market Liquidity risk 
 
26.  Market liquidity is the ability of a banking institution operating in the market to raise 
funds at market prices. When a bank cannot access the market to sell its assets at fair prices and 
has to accept lower or ‘fire sale’ prices, it is experiencing market liquidity risk or distress. 
Market liquidity risk, therefore, refers to banks funding themselves in financial markets and 
possibly creating externalities for others (negative asset price spirals). Funding liquidity risk, on 
the other hand, affects only a single bank.  
 
27.  It is important to highlight the difference and linkages between funding liquidity risk 
and market liquidity risk for three main reasons: 
  
 
(i).  First, it is important to understand that the source of liquidity risk can be the 
existence of asymmetric information which can create uncertainty about bank 
solvency or about the credit quality of structured products, as well as the 
existence of incomplete markets in which aggregate risk cannot be hedged away. 
The roots of a bank liquidity crisis can be varied--resulting from fundamental 
worries about its solvency or from concerns about its business model or 
reputation that provoke a loss of confidence by depositors that could even end up 
in a bank run
25. The key is to assess whether the cause behind the liquidity crisis 
is limited to a single bank problem or is masking a market/systemic liquidity 
issue, as it happened in the earlier phases of the 2007-2008 crisis. 
 
(ii)  The second reason is to analyze the risk propagation channels that cause a bank-
specific liquidity risk to evolve into market liquidity risk, spreading the distress 
into financial markets. A bank liquidity problem, regardless of the cause(s) that 
led to it, can be propagated in the following markets
26: 
 
  Interbank markets: via banks’ payment systems, balance sheet linkages or 
cross holdings of liabilities across banks. It is, therefore, important to 
analyze how interconnected or networked banks are in the financial system, 
since the propagation mechanisms from individual illiquidity can quickly 
become market illiquidity and affect all banks.
27  
 
  Money markets: via flight to quality. If market confidence is diminishing, 
investors start shunning the commercial paper of corporate borrowers in 
favor of safer short-term government debt, thus reducing money market 
liquidity and private sector credit. 
 
  Asset markets: via liquidation of assets at “fire-sale” prices. When the 
interbank market is distressed, banks may seek liquidity by selling assets, 
further pushing asset prices downwards. This creates distortions in the 
financial system, hampering a source of liquidity for banks and weakening 
the banks’ equity base (as mark-to-market valuation rules translate price 
declines into direct losses). The problem can have worse repercussions if the 
assets are highly illiquid and possibly subject to steep price declines, as 
occurred with some securitized products. 
 
(iii)  The third reason this is important is for designing policy responses--according to 
either a single bank liquidity crisis with possible contagion effects, or a systemic 
liquidity crunch with repercussions for the financial system as a whole. Funding 
liquidity risk in a single bank is not a big concern for policy makers since the 
liquidity crisis can be monitored and, in principle, solved by the risk 
management team of the bank in the market or going to the LOLR facilities of 
                                                 
25 The triggers or events that raise liquidity risks are discussed in Section 1 
26 Nikolaou, pages 28-29 
27  A rich literature on “network effects” and the implications for banking system’s analysis and policy is 
beginning to emerge (see Brunnermeier).  
 
the central bank. Central banks play a major role when the funding liquidity risk 
is transmitted to the whole financial system and policy actions are needed to 
prevent or contain spillover effects.   
 
28.  The interaction between funding and market illiquidity is key to understanding how 
systemic financial crises play out. The crisis of 2007-2008 exposed the linkages of these two 
risks and showed that the interaction of the two can have consequences that reach beyond an 
individual institution. The prevalence of securitization made the connection between funding 
liquidity risk and market liquidity risk tighter. Thus, the failure of one bank unveiled a systemic 
problem (insolvency) and threatened a potential crash of the whole banking system, because the 
banking system was highly dependent on market liquidity which was previously taken for 
granted (an illustration of the dangers of “linear thinking” and a classic case of fallacy of 
composition by market players and policy makers). 
 
Recommendation 1: The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAPs) needs to identify 
and focus more on liquidity risks in general, getting a better sense of the term-transformation 
risks assumed by systemically important banks, the quality of liquid assets and liabilities, and 
their relative weights, as well as the liquidity trends observed in the market (ex., shrinking 
share of liquid assets in total bank assets), undertake peer comparisons among systemically 
important banks and foresee liquidity stress scenarios (particularly in countries with currency 
boards or highly eurorized or dollarized financial systems).  .  
 
E.  Central Bank Liquidity 
 
29.  Central Bank liquidity is the ability of a central bank to supply the liquidity needed to 
the financial system, which is measured as the creation of base money from the central bank. 
The central bank’s liquidity results from the bank managing its assets in accordance to its 
monetary policy stance
28. The traditional means by which central banks provided liquidity into 
the financial systems was through their open market operations, which appear in the assets side 
of their balance sheet. More recently, the use of ‘quantitative easing’ by the US Fed has led to 
direct interventions in the market.  
 
30.   
Chart 6: Simplified Central Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities
Open Market Operations Currency
Loans to banks Bank deposits
Government securities Reserves
 
31.  Central Bank liquidity risk is not really discussed in the financial literature because it is 
generally believed that central bank liquidity risk does not exist and central banks are always 
able to supply base money (can never be illiquid). However, it is possible that in periods of 
                                                 
28 Nikolaou, op cit,  page 16  
 
hyperinflation or during an exchange rate crisis there is no demand for domestic currency and, 
therefore, the supply of base money from the central bank has no takers (flight to stronger 
currencies).  
 
32.  There are other risks which affect market liquidity, which often require central bank 
interventions, including: (i) counterparty credit risks when banks do not trust the ability of other 
parties to transactions to honor their commitments; (ii) collateral risks when the quality/value of 
an asset backing an obligation is unknown or subject to great volatility, exposing central banks 
to potential losses in the case of parties defaulting; and (iii) signaling or reputational risks when 
commercial banks are afraid of going to the lender-of-last-resort LOLR facilities for fear of the 
stigma attached to such action. For cross-border commercial banks managing multiple-currency 
liquidity, access to multiple LOLR facilities and collateral in different jurisdictions has made 
even more challenging managing liquidity for commercial banks in different “pockets”. In other 
cases when the country has a currency board central banks can only provide limited liquidity 
support to their banks. In highly dollarized banking systems the central bank might also be 
unable to cover large deposit runs. All these risks impinge on the market liquidity risk in the 
system. 
 
F.  Governance and Liquidity Management 
 
33.  Governance is absolutely critical for managing all risks in a banking organization, a 
requirement that is emphasized by all supervisory agencies. The OCC states in its Handbooks 
that: 
“Given the importance of liquidity to the viability of the bank, the board must be kept 
informed about the bank’s liquidity position and associated risks. Management should 
inform the board periodically of the bank’s liquidity exposure and its contingency 
funding plans. Depending on the circumstances, the board may need to receive frequent 
updates about the plan’s development and implementation”
29. More precisely, the OCC 
imposes detailed requirements on banks’ boards and senior managers, demanding:  
 
  An informed board, capable management, and appropriate staffing, able to   
understand the nature and level of liquidity risk assumed by the bank and the tools 
used to manage that risk; 
  That the bank's funding strategy and its implementation be consistent with their 
expressed risk tolerance; 
  The selection of senior managers who will have the authority and responsibility to 
manage liquidity risks; 
  The ability to monitor the bank's performance and overall liquidity risk profile; 
  That liquidity risk is identified, measured, monitored, and controlled by senior 
management overseeing the daily and long-term management of liquidity risk.  
  That senior managers should: (i) develop and implement procedures and practices 
that translate the board's goals, objectives, and risk tolerances into operating 
standards that are well understood by bank personnel and consistent with the board's 
intent; (ii) adhere to the lines of authority and responsibility that the board has 
                                                 
29  OCC Handbook, page 52.  
 
established for managing liquidity risk; (iii) oversee the implementation and 
maintenance of management information and other systems that identify, measure, 
monitor, and control the bank's liquidity risk; and (iv) establish effective internal 
controls over the liquidity risk management process. 
 
G.  Stages of Funding Crisis 
 
34.  Anticipating as soon as signs of deterioration of liquidity appear, management must take 
immediate remedial action under certain constraints. However, managers are also subject to the 
requirements of their objective function, which is to maximize the bank’s return to shareholders 
(within certain risk tolerance). For the latter reason, the initial actions to restore liquidity 
(Stages 1 and 2 in Chart 7, must attempt to minimize the negative impact on earnings. From 
Stage 3 onwards, the bank’s management is under increasing pressure to take actions which 
privilege liquidity acquisition over short-term return considerations. Stage 4 indicates that 
desperate management measures are required as liquidity reserves can dry up very fast, 
particularly if there is distrust in the bank. Possible supervisory corrective actions would be 
triggered and if the bank’s franchise is still valuable and the bank can be rescued, a supervisory 
approved plan should be put in place, including some LOLR liquidity support (if the bank still 










Stages of a Funding Crisis
Stage 1: No Problem




Stage 2:  Minor Impairment
•The full extent of the problems 
may be hidden
•Trigger more frequent reporting
•Good relationship management 
and communications can help
•Stock liquidity can be built
•Liability terms can be 
lengthened
•New term funding sources can 
be added.
Stage 3: Mounting 
Troubles
More or more events cause 
reductions in confidence
•Too late to add new term 
funding
•Need to implement asset 
sales
•Need to trigger other 
contingent plans
Stage 4: Fall Off the Cliff
•Too late to enhance 
liquidity
•If you built up in Stage 2 
& moved fast in Stage 3 
you have a big parachute–
you will fall slowly & have 
time to cure underlying 
problems or sell
•If you built a small 
parachute,  you will fall 




SECTION 2:  LIQUIDITY RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
35.  Combining the definitions given in the introduction to funding liquidity risk and market 
liquidity risk, it can be concluded that liquidity risk is the risk of not being able to raise funds 
without excess costs to meet the bank’s obligations when due. 
 
36.  The developments in the financial markets and the turmoil of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis highlights the need for banks to have adequate liquidity risk management that defines 
adequate tools to identify, measure, monitor, and manage liquidity risk under different and 
stressed market conditions. Thus, in order for a bank to have successful liquidity risk 
management, it is crucial to develop and implement effective risk measurement tools since there 
is not a single measure that comprehensively quantifies liquidity risk. Assessment of liquidity 
risk involves a mix of tools and metrics that can evaluate the full range of liquidity risks a bank 
may face. It is vital that the tools allow metrics to be calculated under normal conditions 
(business-as-usual) and under stressed conditions, and indicators that not only be static 
measures but also prospective (forward looking) dynamic measures.  
 
 
1.1 Liquidity factors 
 
37.  There is a list of factors that concern liquidity position, which senior management needs 
to look at on an ongoing basis in order to assess liquidity risk by business lines and activities:  
 
 
38.  Volume and composition of balance sheet
30. On the liability side of the balance sheet, 
bank analysts should look at deposits: types, amounts, concentration, possibility of withdrawals 
(contractual versus behavioral); and inter-bank lines of credit and loans: size, maturities, other 
restrictive covenants, and rollover possibilities. On the asset side of the balance sheet a bank 
                                                 
30 Banque de France, Financial Stability Review,” Liquidity Regulation and the lender of last resort”, February 
2008 
Box 2: “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity”
1/ 
 
Economic literature has tried to explain the existence of banks, struggling with two important questions: (i) 
Why is there a demand for bank (sight) deposit contracts when depositors know that there is a small but still 
positive probability of bank runs which are likely to result in a partial or total loss of wealth if banks are forced 
into ‘fire sale’ liquidation? (ii) Why do banks issue bank (sight) deposit contracts while engaging in the 
transformation of liquid deposits into less or illiquid assets, knowing that this term-transformation leaves banks 
vulnerable to runs and the risk of failure?. 
The classic paper by Diamond and Dybvig provides an answer to these two questions, demonstrating that: (i) 
Bank deposit contracts can lead to a superior allocation of wealth and resources for depositors and banks, 
provided confidence is maintained.  They demonstrate that there are multiple equilibria, with different levels 
of confidence, including the undesirable state of a bank run. As they indicate, the “illiquidity of assets provides 
the rationale both for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs” (p.  403). If the optimal risk-
sharing among depositors in normal times is disrupted by a run on the bank--given the sequential nature of 
bank deposit contracts (first-come, first-served)--depositors have the incentive to withdraw their money as fast 
as they can under the expectation that late comers will be faced with partial or total loss. This outcome results 
from the expectation that the face value of deposits will be larger than the liquidation value of the bank’s assets 
if bank owners are forced to liquidate assets in a rush.  Under these circumstances, the only “feasible contract” 
that allows banks both to prevent runs and to provide optimal risk sharing is to suspend the convertibility of 
deposits (as witnessed during the Argentina crisis of 2001 with the infamous “corralito”).   
If the bank is solvent, the suspension of convertibility--when withdrawals are excessive--removes the option of 
at least some depositors withdrawing funds and, in that way, restoring a ‘good equilibrium’.  A second 
mechanism which can be used to achieve the same result is for the government to offer a deposit guarantee 
funded by the power of taxation. To the extent that this insurance offers a credible promise of no-loss, it will 
not need to be fulfilled and a ‘bad equilibrium’ can be avoided.  The third option to stabilize bank deposit 
contracts is to design a lender of last resort facility, able to provide the same guarantee of the deposit insurance 
system. The fourth intervention (although not a direct financial tool) of a preventive nature has to do with a 
regulatory regime to contain liquidity risks. 
In other words, banks are intrinsically vulnerable to shifts in expectations.  Once confidence is lost and, in the 
absence of suspension of convertibility of deposits into cash, fire sales of bank assets become a self fulfilling 
prophecy for bank insolvency, resulting in losses for depositors. 
Diamond and Dybvig’s approach assumes that the liquidity crisis results from a shift in expectations “which 
could depend on almost anything”, and it is not related only to the bad quality or loss of the underlying assets.  
So the fragility of the ‘good equilibrium’ is such that anything that causes depositors to anticipate a run will 
lead to a run. In spite of this fragility, bank deposit contracts are demanded as a form of insurance that allows 
depositors to request their deposits to finance their consumption as needed. The liquidity demand is driven by 
uncertainty and/or the presence of asymmetric information. 
 
1/ Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig, Journal of Political Economy, 1983, Vol.91, no.3.  
 
analyst should look at the health of the current loans, liquidity of all types of assets, and 
uncertainty of new requests for loans. 
 
  Quality of assets and ability to undertake maturity transformation
31.  This is an 
important factor to consider because the more liquid the assets the bank holds, the less 
the maturity transformation that is required (less rollover risk), and the less liquidity 
provision is needed, but the trade off is that most likely the bank’s profitability is also 
low (very risk averse bank).  
 
  Volume and composition of the bank off-balance sheet accounts. After the credit crisis 
of 2007-2008, special attention should be given to derivate products, off-balance sheet 
conduits, structured investment vehicles, guarantees, etc.. Illiquid assets, such as 
securitized products, imply that the price of the assets varies, reflecting marked to 
market valuation accounting
32. The liquidity risk arises because banks tend not to 
establish the required liquidity provisions for covering these risks beforehand, relying 
excessively on the assets liquidation/realization prices to obtain liquidity at a certain 
point. It is crucial, therefore, that banks monitor and control the volume of their 
positions on derivatives markets and be conservative regarding their ability to sell 
illiquid assets at market prices. As mentioned before, there is a ‘collective action 
problem’ or a ‘fallacy of composition’, in the sense that individual bank actions could 
result in downward, self-fulfilling, asset price spirals that are very detrimental to all the 
participants if all banks simultaneously try to liquidate their assets. 
 
Note that both securitizations and off balance sheet activities can either supply or use 
liquidity, depending on the transaction and the level of interest rates at the time. Legally 
binding loan commitments and potential higher rates of draw downs of credit facilities -
when there is a concern regarding the individual bank or generalized market problems – 
could prove to be very risky for banks. Liquidity managers should then carefully assess 
how these activities will affect the bank’s cash flows and liquidity risk on a daily basis, 
using a stressed scenario where unexpected events could occur.  
 
  Concentration of deposits or funds
33. Funding concentration exists when a single 
factor can cause a significant and sudden withdrawal of funds. The liability 
concentration depends on the bank and its balance sheet structure. Concentrations are 
very credit sensitive, although collateralization may mitigate the sensitivity, depending 
on the quality and reliability of the collateral. Concentration of funding sources can 
have a significant impact on liquidity risk, as well as systemic implications for the entire 
banking system. To monitor concentration, management should review reports of large 
funds providers and set customer liability concentration caps to help prevent the bank 
from relying excessively on too few providers or funding sources. It can also define 
market liability concentration limits by segment (for example, foreign banks, money 
markets funds), instrument (for example, Fed funds, CDs) and geographic distribution.  
                                                 
31 Banque de France, Financial Stability Review “Liquidity Risk Management”, February 2008 
32 Banque de France, Financial Stability Review, “Should financial institutions mark-to-market?”, February 2008 
33 OCC, Handbook, page 22  
 
 
  Types of funds providers.
34 This is important in order to distinguish the liquidity risk 
level that each type of creditor poses to the bank. 
 
o  Retail depositors are primarily consumers and small businesses. They are almost 
always federally insured and the customers value their personal relationships 
with the bank. Historically, these deposits are less credit quality and interest rate 
sensitive but, with recent market developments and structural changes, bank 
management can no longer assume that all the retail customers are insensitive to 
credit risk and interest rates. The degree of sensitivity depends on several 
factors, such as the customer’s financial expertise, previous experiences, the 
bank’s geographic location, and investment alternatives. It is, therefore, crucial 
for liquidity mangers to assess the credit and interest rate sensitivity (elasticity) 
of the bank’s retail deposit funding base and encourage close customer contact. 
 
o  Wholesale funds providers are typically large commercial and industrial 
corporations, other financial institutions and brokers, government units, or 
wealthy individuals. Wholesale funds transactions are typically not insured and, 
as a result, they are generally very credit risk and interest sensitive, posing 
greater liquidity risk to the bank. The list of wholesale fund providers--ranked by 
lowest risk tolerance (highest credit sensitivity), based on the OCC’s experience 
is: 
 
  Money market funds 
  Trust funds 
  Pension funds 
  Money market broker/dealers’ own accounts 
  Multinational corporations 
  Government agencies and corporations 
  Insurance companies 
  Regional banks 
  Foreign banks 
  Medium to small corporations 
  Community banks 
  Large domestic banks 
  Individuals 
 
o  Institutional funds providers and other market based sources are significantly 
more price and credit sensitive than retail customers
35 .They are less willing to 
provide funds to banks facing real or perceived financial difficulties. 
Additionally, reliance on market funding sources makes banks more susceptible 
to general or regional economic conditions.  
                                                 
34 OCC, Handbook, pages 14-16 
35 OCC, ‘An Examiner’s Guide to Problem Bank Identification, Rehabilitation and Resolution, Chapter III: 




o  Foreign creditors. Foreign depositors’ behavior may differ from that of domestic 
depositors because of differences in the former’s credit and exchange rate 
sensitivities and their perceptions of the bank’s financial stability. Liquidity 
managers should evaluate the cash flows of foreign deposit accounts separately 
from domestic accounts. The analysis should also distinguish between retail and 
wholesale foreign deposits. 
 
  Net funding gaps, with emphasis on short-term exposures. 
 
  Contractual cash in-flows and outflows (the latter was particularly important in the 
crisis of 2007-2008); 
 
  Cash flows and sources and uses of liquidity.  The analysis should not only be 
retrospective but also prospective, forecasting liquidity needs under different scenarios 
and under sound assumptions to provide a reasonable basis for planning. 
 
  Reputation of the institution in the local market (overall at a particular point in time), 
as a proxy for the ease of access to money markets (measured as spread over US 
Treasury securities). 
 
  Relative cost of funding (access on a cost-effective basis as compared with selected 
peers). 
 
  The functioning of the correspondent, custodian and settlement systems
36.  Banks 
should actively manage their intraday liquidity positions, taking into account that a large 
volume of payments go through these systems. Unexpected changes in their flows can 
have a great impact on the liquidity position and needs of a bank. 
 
  Collateral management
37llook at the policies in place, to identify and estimate the 
bank´s collateral needs and the collateral resources available to meet immediate 
operational needs in the different jurisdictions where the bank operates (cross-border). 
 
  Netting agreements
38 that reduce credit and liquidity risk are important because they 
reduce the intraday liquidity needs, grouping all the positions with different participants 
to a single net position  
 
  Opinion of rating agencies can force certain type of investors and depositors to flee. 
 
  Assessment of the Supervisory Agency (CAMEL ratings or equivalent) regarding the 
general health of the bank.   
 
                                                 
36 CEBS, page 25 
37 CEBS, page 9 
38 CEBS, page 36  
 
  Quality of contingency liquidity plans. 
1.2  Liquidity Indicators 
 
39.  The starting point for the measurement of liquidity comes from comprehensive analysis 
of the cashflows of a bank. This analysis should incorporate the projected cashflows and 
liquidity implications from all material assets, liabilities, off balance sheet positions, and other 
activities of the bank (see Annex II). 
 
40.  Different metrics and indicators are derived from the cashflow analysis and it is, 
therefore, a critical tool for adequately managing liquidity risk. The cashflow analysis should 
take into account the following
39: 
 
  The assumptions should be reasonable and appropriate. Given the critical role of the 
assumptions in projecting future cashflows, it is crucial that they are conservative, 
critically argued, documented, reviewed, and adjusted according to specific bank 
conditions or market circumstances. 
  Principal and interest cashflows should be incorporated under different scenarios 
over time. 
  Pro forma cashflow statements should be forward looking and serve to identify 
liquidity mismatches and liquidity gaps 
  The cashflow projections should be performed over incremental time periods to 
identify projected and contingent cashflows and calculate the cumulative net excess 
or shortfall over the projected timeframe. 
  When projecting cashflows
40, management should estimate customer behavior 
rather than rely expressly on contractual maturities. In addition, it should take into 
account that some cashflows may be seasonal or cyclical and, therefore, may be 
increases or decreases in liquidity in these phases.  
  If the cashflow analysis is presented on a consolidated basis, bank branches or the 
parent company should be able to provide their own cashflow analyses (idem for 
unconsolidated and consolidated groups). 
 
41.  Liquidity analysis requires an integrated review of all relevant cashflows, including any 
inflows and outflows occurring outside the bank. Comprehensive liquidity management should 
analyze entity and consolidated liquidity positions of any significant bank affiliates in a 
multibank holding company, as well as entity liquidity of the parent company and nonbank 
subsidiaries. 
 
42.  The academic literature
41 and bank analysts recommend a number of liquidity 
indicators banks can use to determine their liquidity risks,, including the following: 
 
                                                 
39 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision’, 
June 2008, page 11 
40 OCC, Handbook, page 41 
41 Anthony Saunders, Financial Institutions Management: A Modern Perspective, Second Edition, Irwin-McGraw-
Hill, 1997, pages 329-332.  
 
  Sources and uses of liquidity on a daily basis.  The usual technique is to look at 
liquidity gaps, in a static or dynamic way. Gap time profiles are developed, 
mapping excesses or deficits of funds over time, starting from the maturity 
schedules in the actual balance sheet of the bank. Gaps generate liquidity risk since 
banks might not be able to raise funds without excess costs.  Moreover, there is an 
upper limit or boundary, to determine bank creditors gap size tolerance, depending 
on the bank’s size, credit standing, and market liquidity at each point in time.   
 
  The ‘Financing Gap’ (G) is broadly defined as the difference between [Average 
Loans - Average Deposits].  If G>0, the bank must seek sufficient funds to close the 
gap and make G=0. Banks have three primary sources of liquidity: (i) cash and cash-
type assets (which can be liquidated without loss and at low cost, for example, T-
Bills); (ii) maximum short-term borrowing according to credit limits; and (iii) excess 
reserve requirements or funds in excess of regulatory liquidity ratios the bank might 
have. A rising financing gap G might indicate future liquidity problems if core 
deposits start falling, making the bank increasingly dependent on external market 
borrowing (wholesale funds) to sustain a given volume of lending, at an unknown 
and possibly higher cost of funds. The latter is often seen as the ratio of (core 
deposits/loans). A related indicator we follow closely to look at a potential banking 
system external vulnerability is the loan to deposit ratio (L/D). If this ratio is for 
example two, it means that 60 percent of the loans in the system are funding by 
borrowing abroad (in the market or from the parent bank), making the system very 
vulnerable to rollover risks as it happen early in the crisis in Kazakhstan and the 
Baltic Countries.  
 
43.  The posture the asset-liability management (ALM) function takes regarding the funding 
of the liquidity gaps has to do with the bankers’ expectations as to the future behavior of 
interest rates.  Keeping a balance sheet under-funded makes sense if interest rates are expected 
to fall and the bank expects to face lower funding costs in the future. Over-funding the balance 
sheet implies expectation of rising interest rates. 
 
44.  There are two perspectives to the liquidity gap: the static and the dynamic:  
 
  The static liquidity gap gives the current liquidity position of a bank and indicates 
the imbalance in the cashflows generated by the maturities of the assets and 
liabilities. It is called static because it does not incorporate expected variations in the 
balance sheet elements but gives a point in time snapshot of the liquidity position. 
 
In this indicator, therefore, assets or liabilities that do not have a maturity date are 
not included--such as, equities, funds or real estate. Therefore, the static liquidity 
gap requires the identification of balance sheet elements with a maturity date and 
determining the expected cash flows of each element. 
 
Two types of static liquidity gaps can be calculated: 
  
 
-  Simple static liquidity gap--as the difference between the cashflows (CF) from 
the assets and the cashflows from the liabilities for each term. 
GAP simple at t= CF (Assets)t – CF (Liabilities)t 
 
-  Accumulated static liquidity gap--as the indicator of the accumulated liquidity 
from the beginning of the term. 
GAP accumulated = ∑ CF (Assets) – ∑ CF (Liabilities) 
 
  Due to the limitations of the static liquidity gap, the dynamic liquidity gap 
incorporates ‘dynamism’ from the variations in the interest rates and from the 
behavior of each division of the bank. Therefore, the dynamic liquidity gap uses the 
same formulas as the static gap; the difference between the two comes from the fact 
that the dynamic liquidity gaps give the strategic liquidity position based on the 
expected cashflows from the businesses of the entity under different stress scenarios.  
 
  The objective of the dynamic liquidity gap is to offer a dynamic projection of the 
liquidity indicators under normal circumstances and under stress scenarios, in 
order to identify and quantify the costs, risks and benefits of the liquidity 
generated by each business unit. 
 
  Dynamic liquidity gaps add to the amortization profile of existing assets and 
liabilities the projected loans and deposits the bank expects to grant or attract, 
respectively, over a certain time horizon.
42 A recommended additional indicator 
reflects the ‘cumulative maturity mismatches’ (that is, the cumulative net 
funding requirements as a percentage of total liabilities) over particular time 
intervals--daily, weekly and monthly.  An important caveat is that the bank should 
have a conservative view of the marketability of liquid assets, with a prudent ‘hair 
cut’ or discount to take into account price volatility of assets.
43 Large price swings 
can occur when “crowded trades” are unwounded i.e.; when many traders attempt 
to get out of identical positions in unison.
44 
 
  An obvious difficulty results from the fact that existing balances are known, but 
not necessarily their maturity. Most assets and liabilities have contractual 
repayments schedules, but many others do not.  Demand deposits are liabilities 
without maturity, while assets might change as committed lines of credit--
including those of credit cards--are used without notice.  Finally, to make things 
more complex, prepayment options are embedded in some loans (mortgages).   
Bankers must understand these contingencies to determine, measure, and manage 
their liquidity risks.   
 
  Liquidity  ratios:  
                                                 
42  Joel Bessis, Risk Management in Banking, Second Edition, Wiley & Sons, 2002.  See Section 5, on Asset-
Liability Management, pages, 131-150. 
43 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity of Banking Organizations’, 
Basel, February 2000, page 5 
44 Brunnermeier, op. cit., page 23.  
 
 
45.  Balance sheet ratios alone should not be used to measure liquidity risks since they fail to 
properly capture
45: expected funding needs or commitments, available borrowing sources, and 
banks’ ability to convert assets to cash. They are point-in-time indicators but not reliable risk 
measures, hence they should not be relied upon solely but used in conjunction with dynamic 
forward-looking tools such as cashflow reports or sources and uses of funds analysis. They 
should always be used in conjunction with more qualitative information about borrowing 
capacity, such as the likelihood of increased requests for early withdrawals, decreases in credit 
lines, transaction sizes, and concentration of assets, or shortening of term funds available to the 
bank. These exercises should also be stressed not to assume that ample liquidity is a given. 
 
46.  Moody’s Analytics
46 recommends a balanced approach to put into perspective ratio 
analysis, looking a trilogy: 
 
 
Absolute Standards (ratios)        Trend Analysis                   Peer Analysis 
 
 
Some additional useful balance sheet ratios are
47: 
 
  (Short-term liquid assets/short-term liquid liabilities): ideally greater than 
one (after a discount of asset prices to reflect potential volatility, although most 
likely these assets trade near par in ready markets even in periods of stress). 
  (Total loans/ total deposits ratio), this ratio has been particularly important in 
the crisis countries in Europe and Central Asia where ratios in excess of two in 
countries like Kazakhstan and Latvia signaled great vulnerability to rollover and 
foreign exchange risks as it showed that more half of domestic FX loans were 
being funded with FX external borrowing with large maturity gaps.  
  (Borrowed Funds/total assets ratio) or (Market Funds – Liquid Assets)/ 
Total Assets to assess market funds reliance.  
  (Liquid assets – Short term liabilities): basic surplus measures the cushion that 
liquid assets provide over immediate funding needs. 
  (Total and net overnight funding volume/total assets): this ratio shows what 
proportion of funding is purchased in the overnight funding markets.  
  (Loan commitments/outstanding loans ratio) 
  Liquid assets ratio: (Liquid assets/short-term assets) 
  Leverage ratio: (total assets/total equity), this ratio is really a component of 
the return on equity ratio (ROE) which can be decomposed as the product of the 
return on assets (ROA) times the leverage ratio (ROE=ROA x Leverage). 
  (Total loans/ total equity capital) 
 
                                                 
45 Office of  Comptroller of the Currency, ‘The Challenges of Sound Liquidity Risk Management: OCC 
Expectations and Policy for Community Banks’ , May 2001 
46 Moody’s Analytics, “Restructuring Financial Institutions: Training Course”, World Bank, October 26-29, 2009. 
47 OCC, Handbook, page 62  
 
If the first two ratios above are relatively high, the bank shows high 
dependence/reliance on short-term money market borrowings rather than on own 
sources of funding (like core deposits).  If the third ratio is also high and it implies 
contractual commitments to disburse funds, the bank is also exposed to higher 
liquidity risks on the asset side. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is important to be cautious about balance sheet indicators 
which can be backward looking and can potentially give a false sense of security--
implicitly suggesting that ‘the future is likely to be like the past’ when it is obvious 
that there are many surprises and ‘innovations’ around the corner. Certainly, it 
would be extremely risky to drive a car while just looking through the back mirror! 
For this reason, a lot of effort must be put into developing prospective (as opposed 
to retrospective) approaches to liquidity requirements and management, while 
combining the absolute ratio analysis with a review of liquidity trends and peer 
analysis as suggested above.   
 
  A useful, but hard to estimate, forward looking bounded liquidity ratio:  1.0 < 
[Projected cash-in-flows/Projected cash-outflow] Bucket i < 1.20 (or pre-defined 
‘comfort’ level). 
 
   Liquidity Index (I )- which compares ‘fire sale’ asset prices (Pf) with ‘fair market 
prices’ (Pm) to capture the degree of liquidity of a given asset as a function of how 
different these prices are.  I= ∑ [(wi) (Pf/Pm), where (wi) is the percentage of each 
asset in the bank’s portfolio and the ∑ (wi) =1. 
 
47.  The above list of indicators is not exhaustive and, as usual, they should be used with 
care. However, it points at the importance of banks having careful liquidity planning and a good 
understanding of the volatility of the different items in the bank’s balance sheet, particularly 
good probabilistic models of the degree of stability of different types of deposits. 
 
Recommendation 2:  FSAPs should look more closely at the current position and especially 
to trends (3-5 years) and peer comparisons of changes in liquidity of the largest (5) banking 
institutions. At least the following ratios should be looked at: (i) Loans to Deposits (L/D); (ii) 
Short-term Liabilities to Short-term Assets (STL/STA); (iii) [(Market Funds- Liquid Assets)/ 
Total Assets]; (iv) Cash-in-hand; and (v) Wholesale Funds to Total Liabilities; as 
recommended by the OCC to its bank examiners. A more demanding test would be to require 
larger banks to provide their liquidity gap profiles (in different currencies), concentration of 
deposits, flow of funds analyses, and contingency funding plans (CFP). It is highly 
recommended to look at the CFP for the largest bank in the system. 
  
 
Chart 8: Best Practice Liquidity Risk Measurement 






Multi-period cash flow projections 
 
Projected Cashflows: 
1. Base  case  projection 
2.  Large & Wholesaler Banks: daily time 
buckets (first projected week), 3 weekly 
time buckets, 11 monthly buckets 
3. Smaller  and  Retail  Banks: monthly buckets 
Decomposition:  
1.  Contractual versus behavior-driven cash 
in/out flows (both on and off balance sheet). 
2.  Non-discretionary cashflows versus assumed 
new borrowings, and loans and securities 
sales (remedial actions). 
Stress Levels: mild (with new loan 
commitments), serious, and worst-case scenarios. 
 
 
Quantification of the bank’s liquidity reserve  
(that is, pool of assets ready for sale in the event 
of a liquidity crisis) 
Criteria to Assess Asset Marketability: 
  (Position of asset category held by the 
bank/volume of asset category traded) 
  Turnover ratio for asset category; 
  Credit quality of asset; 
  Tenor and interest rate of asset; 
  Market conditions at point of sale. 
Metric:  




Key risk indicators and trends (early warning) 
Differentiate by type of bank: Wholesaler bank 
(more vulnerable) and Retail bank (with deposits 
largely insured). 
Metrics for defined time horizon: 
  Forecast of funding requirements (specific 
bank and banking system); 
  Forecast of liquid assets (bank and market); 
  Dependence on short-term borrowings 
  Changes in credit quality (NPLs and 
delinquency); 
  Operational risk loss; 
  Spreads for purchase funds compared to 
peers; 
Position of the economy in the business cycle. 
Source: Matz, Leonard, ‘Liquidity Risk- New Lessons and Old Lessons’, Sungard, Bancwire Risk Monthly, 
September 2007.1.3  Internal Warning Triggers 
  
 
48.  It is incumbent upon senior management to implement procedures to identify the 
emergence of liquidity triggers events and to measure how these factors can cause deterioration 
in the liquidity facilities. Some of the early internal warning triggers for banks include
48: 
 
  Increasing levels of delinquent and non-accrual loans which might be ‘hidden’ 
(through ‘ever greening’), under-reported and seriously under provisioned.  
  Adverse trend in overnight and short-term net funds borrowed, reflecting poor 
treasury operations, deteriorating bank reputation in the market or vulnerabilities in 
the financing structure of the bank when market conditions tightened. 
  Adverse trends in liability concentration from volatile sources. Increased reliance 
on market funding sources leaves institutions more exposed to the price and credit 
sensitivities of major fund providers, increasing roll over risk, making them more 
vulnerable to sudden liquidity shortages; 
  Adverse trend in the size of liquid assets indicates that the bank is approaching a 
danger zone. Liquid assets are usually defined as: cash, near cash; assets that can be 
liquidated immediately at no loss (T-Bills and other government paper in deep 
markets—not in all markets), unconditional or contractual lines of credit available 
to a bank and normal access to money markets at reasonable cost, and assets that 
can easily be securitized.  However, the ‘normality’ of market conditions and the 
‘ease of access’ to liquidity cannot be taken for granted, in view of changes in the 
business cycle, monetary policy, and other macroeconomic policies, and also due to 
bank-specific factors. Moreover, the “new normal” after the crisis will not be the 
same as the old “equilibrium”.; 
  Deteriorating overall cash flow. As mentioned earlier, liquidity shocks can occur 
from the asset or the liability side, or both, as liquidity is eventually a residual of 
the bank’s operations and many factors can impact it. Therefore, excessive credit 
expansion might be a prime source of deteriorating bank liquidity. The primacy of 
cashflow over other variables cannot be emphasized enough, since sustainable 
liquidity is the key source of survival for a bank. 
  Declining earnings. Again, this is important as a symptom of problems in different 
parts of a bank’s operations—from strategy to management to other fundamentals.  
  Increasing contingent liabilities. It is crucial to identify, measure, and monitor the 
potential cashflows coming from contingent liabilities, as they can have a big 
impact on the liquidity position of the bank. 
  Adverse trend in the size of transactions. 
  Adverse trend in the liquidity ratios or for a particular bank compared to its peers. 
  Drying up of alternative sources of liquidity. 
  Decline in the cushion of unencumbered highly liquid assets. 
  Persistent breaches of risk limits: limit exceptions can be early indicators of 
excessive risk or inadequate liquidity risk management. 
                                                 
48 Leonard Matz, ‘Crisis Management’, slides presented at the Sound Liquidity Management Principles- Industry 
and Regulatory Perspectives Seminar, sponsored by APRA, Australia, May 3-4, 2007.  
 
  Increase in currency mismatches. 
  Funding deterioration signals: increased funding costs, counterparties requiring 
collateral, correspondent banks decreasing credit lines availability, etc..Reduced 
depositors confidence: starting early withdrawals’Excessive’ Securitization: asset 
securitization raises liquidity considerations as experienced in the crisis of 2007-
2008, when it was difficult to convert these assets into cash during the time that 
there were market disruptions that hampered market access. This eventuality should 
be a concern when a bank makes increasing use of asset securitization. In this 
sense, a bank should consider specific trigger events that may affect the pool of 
securitized assets. 
 
1.4   External warning triggers 
 
49.  Among the external triggers to detect bank-specific liquidity problems, the following 
are noteworthy: 
 
  Widening funding spreads relative to peers. 
  Adverse trend in deposit growth with loss of market share. 
  Adverse trend in renewal of maturing liabilities as some depositors defect the bank. 
  Adverse trends in TED spread, country spread, swap spread, CDs curve, equity 
indexes. 
  Increasing redemptions of CDs before maturity. 
  Temporary funding difficulties or turn downs of borrowing requests. 
  Difficulty in accessing markets, especially foreign exchange markets when the bank 
operates in multiple currencies. 
  Decline in stock prices relative to benchmark. 
  Downgrading by a rating agency. 
  Adverse tax and regulatory changes. 
  Decrease in the prices of the assets that compose the securitization pool (market 
liquidity risk). 
 
1.5   Macro Factors 
 
50.  Macro factors can cause non-normal liquidity conditions that can have an impact on all 
banks with different degrees of severity. The following factors are worth mentioning: 
 
  The start of an economy-wide ‘credit credit “crunch’”, which might lead to an 
abnormal use of contractual liquidity facilities by prime borrowers (possibly 
reflecting difficulties in accessing capital markets). 
  Slowdown or weakening of critically important economic sectors  or industries 
(housing, commodity prices, transport sector, trade-related sectors, etc.). 
  Slower deposit growth and increased competition for deposits, possibly reflecting a 
loss of trust in the domestic currency and flight to foreign exchange FX, or loss of 
confidence in the domestic banking system and flight to cash.  
 
  Adverse macroeconomic conditions, possibly reflecting deteriorating fiscal or 
external accounts. 
  Declining stock market prices or earnings. 
  Ratings downgrades for bank or competitors.  
  High banking competition
49. It can even be the case that in high levels of banking 
competition, banks may be reluctant to lend to competitors for fear of losing market 
share.  
 
51.  Bank managers have the duty to be alert and vigilant about changing circumstances in 
their competitive environment that might affect their bank, and to watch for changes in 
macroeconomic circumstances which might also impact them. This is a tall order of business 
since the future can be quite unpredictable.  In view of this, it is prudent to build cushions—in 
the form of higher capital and higher liquidity cushions—which can mitigate unexpected 
events.  Matz
50 envisages the different stages of a bank funding crisis (see Chart 7 above), 
where banks transition from ‘normal times’ to face increasingly severe impairments, before 
reaching a point of no return when the bank collapses. 
 
52.  The old case of the failure of the Continental Illinois bank in 1984 is illustrative (see 
Box 3) of a rapidly growing bank with a high sector concentration of its loan portfolio. On the 
other hand, the recent Northern Rock bank episode (see Box 4) is illustrative of  the systematic 
risk posed by excessive dependence on securitization as a form of short-term funding (funding 
liquidity risk) and high reliance on smooth market functioning (market liquidity risk). Both 
cases highlight the consequences of poor liquidity management. 
                                                 
49 Banque de France, Financial Stability Review, ‘Overview: Liquidity in a time of financial turbulence’, February 
2008 
50 Op.cit., with adaptations from the author.  
 
 
Box . “One Bank’s Liquidity Crisis: Continental Illinois”
1/ 
 
The episode of the crisis at the Chicago-based Continental Illinois bank in 1984 is noteworthy in analyzing the causes and 
triggers that can lead to one bank’s failure and the development of its liquidity crisis.  
1.  Analyzing the causes that trigger the liquidity crisis 
Business strategy: aggressive growth strategy. Corporate finance literature
2   highlights that rapid growth is not always a 
positive factor unless management takes active steps to control it. The term ‘sustainable growth’ is used to express that a 
company should not grow above its sustainable growth rate, which is its growth rate in equity. In applying this lesson to 
banking, the conclusion is that growth is not necessarily something that needs to be maximized--bank management should 
understand that rapid growth creates financial challenges that must be anticipated and managed. 
Continental Illinois´ strategy was to provide ‘cheap’ loans, especially to energy companies. During its growth period, the 
bank’s management was praised by the industry and market for its aggressive strategy. The indicators that not only the 
industry but also the management were looking at were profitability ratios: high returns on equity and high returns on 
average assets.  
Balance sheet liquidity indicators: What management and observers failed to pay attention to were the bank’s liquidity 
indicators which showed increased risks during its rapid growth: 
- Loans to assets increased dramatically, meaning, the greater the share of loans in the bank’s portfolio the greater the 
default risk it was exposed to. 
- The return on assets (ROA) was decreasing; 
- The equity to assets ratio was falling; 
- Non-performing loans were increasing but this was viewed as a short-term problem. 
Composition funding sources (liabilities): Continental Illinois had little retail banking business and, therefore, a small share 
of core deposits and little franchise value. Its sources of funding were based on Fed funds, CDs and volatile short-term and 
less expensive instruments rather than longer-term funds. This funding strategy exposed the bank to high and continuous 
rollover risks and the need for searching new sources of funding. 
When the crisis started in the aftermath of the Penn Square failure, Continental Illinois was unable to fund itself from 
domestic markets, so it turned to foreign money markets and significantly increased its foreign deposit levels.  
Assets Composition: Continental Illinois followed an aggressive lending strategy based on aggressive loan pricing, focusing 
on selected areas. Over time, Continental was originating loans with interest rates lower than those used earlier. Taking into 
account the increase in interest rates over that period, it implied the bank adopted a below market pricing strategy. However, 
it did not use securitized products to reduce its illiquid assets. 
Risk concentration: Continental Illinois’ activities were highly concentrated in the energy sector, especially on gas and oil 
companies. It was, therefore, highly exposed to the volatility of energy prices. However, this vulnerability was not viewed 
by the management as a risk but rather only as a short-term problem. Thus, the drop in oil prices in 1981 that negatively 
affected the energy companies to which Continental Illinois had lent was minimized by the management.  
Type of creditors: Small retail deposit funding which is viewed as being relatively stable, with less credit and interest rate 
sensitivity than other funding sources. Thus, the increased use of market funding sources from Continental Illinois resulted 
in a higher exposure to the price and credit sensitivities of major fund providers 
Wholesale fund providers are very sensitive to perceived changes in a bank’s credit capacity as they are unsecured -- as 
opposed to retail depositors. Specifically, Continental Illinois relied on Fed Funds, CDs and foreign deposits. CDs are 
negotiable instruments, saleable to a secondary investor. While retail CDs generally allow for early redemptions with 
penalties, wholesale CDs generally do not. Fed funds are unsecured funds traded daily by banks using excess reserves. The 
market is primarily overnight, therefore, these funds have very short maturity. They are not deposits, so they are not FDIC 
insured, although, they are usually considered to have very low credit risk. But if a bank experiences financial difficulties, it 
may find its ability to borrow in this market hampered or eliminated. 
Moreover, wholesale funding needs to be rolled over regularly and, therefore, Continental Illinois was exposed to variations 
in the liquidity of funding markets. 
 
1/ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Continental Illinois and ‘Too Big to Fail’, History of the Eighties--Lessons 
for the Future, Volume I, Chapter 7, 1997 
2/ Higgins, ‘Managing Growth’, Analysis for Financial Management, Chapter 4, 9
th edition 
Box. 3: ‘One Bank’s Liquidity Crisis: Continental Illinois’  
 
Foreign depositors: Foreign deposits are usually Eurodollar deposits that are traded in the wholesale market. These funds 
are structured as interest-bearing time instruments--very liquid and short term maturities--and are denominated in the 
domestic currency rather than the currency of the foreign country. They are not insured by the FDIC. Foreign depositors’ 
behavior may differ from that of domestic depositors because of differences in their credit sensitivities and their perceptions 
of the bank’s financial stability. 
Cash flows: Continental Illinois experienced a decrease in earnings which clearly deteriorated its liquidity position. 
However, the management did not view this as a problem in its fundamentals but rather as a temporary shock. 
No internal controls: Continental Illinois’ management failed to design internal controls to monitor liquidity and credit risk 
and a contingency funding plan was not put in place. 
External warnings that showed the increasing liquidity risk: 
- Economic conditions: Rising interest rates.  
- Latin America debt crisis: Continental Illinois had significant exposure to these countries, so when the crisis 
  emerged in this region it reinforced the worries about the bank’s stability. 
- Stock prices declined almost 37 percent in 1982 due to the negative consequences of the continuing decline of the 
  energy sector in Continental Illinois’ performance. 
- CAMEL downgrade to 4. 
- However there was no downgrade from any credit rating agency, Fitch maintained its rating, despite the increasing 
  volume of non-performing loans coming from the energy companies that Continental Illinois was exposed to. 
2.  Analyzing the development of the crisis 
Penn Square Bank failure: The Penn Square Bank failed due to speculative oil and gas exploration loans. Continental 
Illinois had invested heavily in Penn Square, so the failure of the latter had a negative impact on Continental Illinois' 
earnings and market confidence. 
Increased CD rates: The loss of confidence in the aftermath of the Penn Square failure meant that Continental Illinois had to 
pay higher rates on its CDs. 
Depositors run: The rumors in the market about potential Continental Illinois bankruptcy led depositors to run away. 
Overseas depositors and even domestic correspondent banks moved away. 
Fed discount window: When the run started, Continental Illinois had to borrow from the Fed discount window; but this, 
however, did not prevent the depositors from running away.  
FDIC assistance package: FDIC had to intervene as concerns were raised about the spillover effects that the bank crisis 
could have on the entire banking system (“too big to fail”). Thus, FDIC provided guarantees of protection to all depositors 
and creditors.  
‘Nationalization’: As outflows continued, FDIC tried to find a merger partner for Continental Illinois but it could not. 
Finally, FDIC acquired 80 percent ownership of Continental Illinois 
3.  What are the lessons from Continental Illinois regarding liquidity management? 
- Rapid loan growth is not necessarily a good indicator of the performance of a bank. Aggressive asset growth requires that 
liquidity needs and sources be planned for accordingly. Experience tells us that excessive bank credit growth quite often 
ends in ‘tears’. 
- A small retail deposit funding base, with high dependence on wholesale funding, is risky. Wholesale funds providers are 
more credit sensitive and less willing to provide funding during financial difficulties. It also exposes the bank to continued 
rollover risk. 
- Concentration on one particular segment makes the bank very vulnerable to shocks in that segment, posing high liquidity 
risk. Banks need to diversify funding sources to prevent a liquidity crisis. 
- Adequate liquidity risk management can prevent banks from going to the LOLR to be rescued. Robust liquidity 
management is critical to identify liquidity risks and put in place actions contained in the bank’s contingency funding plan 
to overcome liquidity crises.  
 
 
Box 4: ‘One Bank Liquidity Crisis: Northern Rock’
1/ 
The episode of the failure of the Northern Rock bank in the United Kingdom in September 2007 is telling because it 
unfolded at the onset of the credit crunch of 2007-2008. It is also noteworthy to compare the differences and similarities 
in the causes and events that led to the liquidity crisis at Northern Rock with those at Continental Illinois. 
The main difference with Continental Illinois was that in the case of Northern Rock, the deposit run was not ‘the event’ 
that triggered its liquidity crisis; rather, the deposit run was an ‘an event’ that happened in the aftermath of its liquidity 
crisis. 
1.  Analyzing the causes that triggered the liquidity crisis 
Business Strategy:  Northern Rock followed an aggressive and risky strategy of expansion, increasing its market share by 
providing mortgage loans at low and ultra-competitive effective rates while funding  itself with short-term wholesale 
funds, including an over-ambitious securitization strategy  as a fundamental part of the bank’s normal funding strategy]. 
Northern Rock moved from being a regional bank to becoming the fifth largest bank in the UK through rapid growth of 
its mortgage assets, while its traditional funding base of retail deposits diminished to very low levels.    
Formulating an institution´s funding strategy and defining its risk tolerance are the fundamental responsibility of its Board 
of Directors which is then implemented by the bank’s senior management. The Board of Directors of Northern Rock was 
held responsible for the continued success of its funding strategy at a time when there were indicators of potential 
problems on the funding side. Northern Rock failed to have Board-approved strategies for managing liquidity risk, under 
going-concern assumptions, and under stressed conditions. 
Composition funding sources (liabilities): Northern Rock relied heavily on non-retail funding--only 20 percent of its 
liabilities came from retail deposits and only a small proportion of them consisted of the traditional branch-based 
deposits. Most of the retail deposits came from non-branch deposits--such as, postal, telephone, internet, and offshore 
accounts. This reliance on non-branch deposits exposed the bank to significant risk as non-branch deposits are more 
vulnerable to withdrawal than retail deposits
2. The length and depth of bank-customer relationships are factors that 
characterize retail deposits, and are seen as significant to mitigating depositors’ propensity to run. 
Most of Northern Rock’s funding (75 percent of it
3)  came from short-term borrowing in the wholesale markets, interbank 
deposits, securitized notes, and other long-term funding sources such as covered bonds. The latter were long-term 
liabilities written against segregated mortgage assets and, as such, they were illiquid and long-term in nature.  
Besides the risk of funding long-term loans with short-term wholesale funds, wholesale fund providers are considered less 
willing to provide funds to banks facing real or perceived financial difficulties as their funds are not insured and they are, 
thus, more credit sensitive. 
It was the use of securitized notes that made Northern Rock’s business model unusual, its balance sheet less traditional 
and, in the end, largely responsible for the bank’s downfall. While securitization allowed banks to obtain liquidity from 
illiquid assets, it also makes them more reliant on the smooth functioning and stability of financial markets (market 
liquidity risk). If liquidity from securitizations dries up, banks are left with an unexpected funding gap, as happened in the 
Northern Rock case. The securitized notes were of medium- to long-term maturity, with average maturity of over one 
year. The bank assigned portions of its mortgage assets to a trust which then entered into an agreement with special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs). Unlike in the US securitization process where the SPVs are off balance sheet vehicles, in the 
UK, Northern Rock consolidated them on its balance sheet. Thus, when the crisis started and the trust could not place 
more paper with investors, the notes planned to be issued in September had to be taken back by Northern Rock in its 
balance sheet, draining its cash.  
Types of creditors: The creditors of Northern Rock were not ‘normal’ depositors but sophisticated investors who tailor 
their risk-taking strategies to rapidly unfolding events. Therefore, in good times, it is easy to obtain funding from these 
creditors, but in bad times it is very hard. As opposed to retail depositors, these creditors face constraints in their 
decisions--they are subject to external constrains such a small fluctuations in the markets that can cause large shifts in 




Box 4: (cont). “One Bank’s Liquidity Crisis: Northern Rock” 
 
Asset Composition: Most of Northern Rock’s assets were mortgage loans at low and ultra-competitive effective rates of 
interest. 
Internal warnings showed the increasing liquidity risk being taken, measured by: 
- High leverage ratio (total assets to common equity): Northern Rock´s leverage ratio climbed from 22 percent to 58 
percent in a few years. When the crisis exploded, the ratio jumped even higher due to the depletion of its common equity 
from the losses suffered. 
- Linear thinking: The rapid growth of the bank’s balance sheet was predicated on the assumption of uninterrupted 
benign credit conditions and market access, while the bank’s high leverage made it very vulnerable to a reversal in 
market conditions.  
2.  Analyzing the development of the crisis 
Fluctuations in funding conditions: The market started to show tightening credit conditions through higher ‘haircuts’ in 
the repo market. 
Run of short/medium term creditors: The true run on Northern Rock was not the few retail depositors queuing at its 
branches, but the ‘invisible run’ of the wholesale investors that refused to renew their maturing loans and deposits. It 
was the withdrawal from the market of the short-term and medium-term creditor that had previously bought Northern 
Rock paper that caused the liquidity crisis. It was not, thus, the classic coordination failure model of bank runs by 
branch-based depositors that was the immediate cause of the crisis, but the fear and run of other creditors. An important 
fact to bear in mind is that the withdrawal of credit hit the whole market and not simply Northern Rock. 
Therefore, when the short-term funding disappears, highly leveraged institutions like Northern Rock--holding long term, 
illiquid, assets financed with short-term debt--face a liquidity crisis. 
Spillover effects: When the financial system as a whole finances long-term, illiquid assets funded with short-term 
liabilities, it is impossible that all the institutions can be hedged in terms of their maturity profile. Thus, Northern Rock 
was the ‘pinch point’ in the financial system where the tensions were finally manifested. 
The roots of the liquidity risk, therefore, stem from securitization practices, combined with the market’s inability to keep 
up with them in terms of risk assessment, pricing, and management. 
3.  What are the lessons from Northern Rock regarding liquidity management? 
- High dependence on securitization poses high market liquidity risk. The functioning of the markets cannot be taken for 
granted. Banks should undertake adequate stress-testing to measure and manage their capacity to absorb liquidity 
shocks. 
- Concentration in securitized financing poses not only liquidity risk but also systemic implications for the entire 
banking system. 
- Financing long-term assets (mortgage loans) with short-term funding creates a high level of leverage only sustainable 
under benign credit conditions. The high leverage made the bank vulnerable to a reversal in the maximum leverage 
tolerated by the market.  
- Liquidity risk was priced too low; it was believed that the bank’s capital base offered enough cushion to face financial 
difficulties. Institutions should have in place adequate internal mechanism and liquidity buffers to verify that all 
liquidity risks are covered in both normal and stressed times. 
 
 
1/ Song Shin, ‘Reflections on modern bank runs: a case study of Northern Rock’, Princeton University, August 2008 
2/ Iyer and Puri, ‘Understand bank runs: the importance of depositor-bank relationships and networks’, Working Paper, 
NBER, August 2008 
3/ Buitter, “Lessons from the North Atlantic financial crisis”, London School of Economics and Political Science, May 
2008  
 
SECTION 3:  LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
53.  Liquidity risk management
51 refers to the internal policies and procedures put in place 
by an institution/bank to measure, manage and monitor its liquidity. The design of the liquidity 
risk management should be tailored to the size, degree of internationalization, and the strategy 
and complexity of the institution’s business model. Financial institutions should be aware that 
liquidity risk management is and should remain a cost center – but a vital one for the bank’s 
operation and continuity as an ongoing concern. 
 
54.  The ongoing liquidity management objectives of a bank should be: the maintenance of 
an appropriate amount of liquid assets under normal and stressed conditions, the measurement 
and projection of funding requirements under various scenarios, and the management of access 
to contingency funding sources (according to the bank’s, up to date, contingency funding plan). 
 
55.  A bank’s liquidity risk management plan should start by defining a clear liquidity 
strategy that should be communicated to and understood by all in the organization. The strategy 
must be approved by the bank’s Board of Directors (see discussion on governance above). 
Senior management should be responsible for clearly defining the liquidity risk management 
policy and the procedures for its implementation, measuring all costs of  alternative liquidity 
strategies, controlling the liquidity risks across the banking group on an ongoing basis, and 
monitoring trends and developments that may affect the liquidity strategy.  
 
56.  The liquidity risk management structure should be reviewed, as needed, to reflect 
changing business and financial market conditions, and all business units should be aware of 
any change in the liquidity strategy.  
 
57.  Bank management must manage not only the bank’s assets, liabilities and off balance 
sheet cashflows, but also the release of financial information to the public. Communications at 
times of distress are absolutely critical—as many balance-sheet solvent but failed banks can 
corroborate. The public’s perception about the soundness of a bank can change quickly. 
Customer reaction is difficult to predict but it really affects the liquidity needs of the bank, 
often abruptly, precipitating the need for access to contingency sources. Therefore, it is very 
crucial that bank management have effective processes in place to monitor and react to any 
contractions in deposits and other funding
52. Thus, it is not only important to have a strategy but 
also, critically, a mechanism for implementing it. 
 
2.1  Liquidity Principles
53 
 
58.  In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 “credit crunch”, the Basel Committee, , updated in 
June 2008 the principles for the assessment of liquidity management in order to reinforce the 
importance of sound liquidity risk management by the banking system (see Annex IV).  
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59.  The aim of these principles is to be not merely a declaration of good intentions, but also 
to provide guidance to banks, so that the principles are incorporated into their management 
strategies, be enforced, and serve to prevent or mitigate the mistakes exposed during the 2007-
2008 crisis. 
 
60.  The main features of the new approach are to: 
 
  Emphasize the importance of establishing liquidity risk tolerance limits and 
maintaining an adequate level of liquidity through a cushion of liquid assets. 
  Stress the necessity of allocating liquidity costs, benefits and risks to the various 
business lines and activities. 
  Emphasize the necessity of identifying and measuring the full range of liquidity 
risks, including contingent liquidity risks. 
  Require the incorporation of severe stress scenarios and robust contingency funding 
plans in banks’ strategies and contingency funding plans. 
  Promote public disclosure information to enhance market discipline. 
 
 
2.2   Liquidity Controls 
 
61.  The liquidity risk assessment of a bank is not complete until senior management and 
supervisors assess, test and feel comfortable with the internal liquidity controls the bank has in 
place. The liquidity controls pursued should aim to ensure the integrity of the liquidity risk 
management process, and make senior management responsible for ensuring implementation. 
 
62.  The bigger and more complex the bank, the more thorough should be its review and 
controls. The latter include the following items: 
 
  Oversight by the Board of Directors and senior management: responsible for 
understanding the nature and level of liquidity risk assumed by the bank and the 
tools used to manage that risk.  
 
  ALM (Asset /Liability Management) Committee: responsible for ensuring that 
measurement systems are adequate for identifying and quantifying the bank’s 
liquidity exposure and the reporting systems (MIS) communicate accurate, timely 
and relevant information about the level and sources of that exposure.  
 
  Governance: head office and senior management’s understanding of the issues and 
ability to anticipate and control; 
 
  Clarity of written policies, procedures and approval authority; 
  
 
  Definition of risk limits: setting ceilings for borrowing capacity, funding maturity 
gaps, exposure to a single source or market and to unsecured borrowing
54. The bank 
should set the limits according to its business in terms of location, complexity of the 
activity, nature of the products, currencies, and markets served, that is, it may set 
limits on an intra-group basis. The limit framework should also include measures to 
ensure that, under stress, the liquidity available will exceed the liquidity needs. 
 
  Information: The MIS must be able to provide reliable, comprehensive, and timely 
information. IT systems are crucial for providing senior management with timely 
and forward looking information on the liquidity position of the bank and to monitor 
compliance with the limits and policies established. MIS should be able to: 
 
o  Calculate liquidity positions: in all currencies--per branches and subsidiaries, 
and on an aggregate group basis. 
o  Provide liquidity positions on an intra-day basis, day-to-day basis, and longer 
time periods, to be used by liquidity risk management. 
o  Capture all sources of liquidity risk, including contingent risks. 
o  Deliver granular information under stress scenarios. 
 
  Execution and post-execution (cost-effectiveness of measures taken) reporting. 
 
  Intra-day liquidity management
55 that ensures a bank meets its liquidity payments 
obligations and receives customers’ inflows on time. Intra-day liquidity 
management requires appropriate anticipation and planning of flows throughout the 
day to make sure that cash and collaterals will be available for use in payment and 
settlement systems in normal and stressed times. Thus, it should: 
 
o  Measure the expected daily liquidity inflows and outflows. 
o  Identify key counterparties, times and circumstances that may pose particular 
liquidity needs. 
o  Monitor key positions frequently and forecast potential funding shortfalls. 
 
  Multiple Currency Liquidity Management. Cross-currency liquidity management 
makes institutions heavily reliant on the smooth functioning of foreign exchange 
markets, and those markets did not always function as expected during the 2007-
2008 crisis. Thus, special attention should be paid when a liquidity event occurs 
because transferability, convertibility or country risks can abruptly change. 
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2.3   Liquidity Reports 
 
63.  Liquidity reporting is important at all times but even more so as the liquidity conditions 
of the bank deteriorate during the different stages of a funding crisis (as mentioned earlier). 
Before moving on to discuss the key features of liquidity reports, it is important to point out 
that as liquidity deteriorates, the frequency of liquidity reports must increase. The scope of 
liquidity reports should also probably change as conditions worsen, to show increasing details, 
supplemental reports for certain bank units or bank operations or subsidiaries, and additional 
benchmarking of the bank against peers (spreads over cost of funds). 
  
 
64.  Liquidity reports aim at reporting the bank’s exposure to liquidity risk at all times—
under normal circumstances and under stress—so that senior management can identify any 
negative trends and implement mitigation actions in response. From these reports, bank 
management should learn how much liquidity risk the bank is assuming, whether management 
is complying with risk limits, and whether management’s strategies are consistent with the risk 
tolerance approved by its Board. 
 
65.  The critical information that must definitely be contained in liquidity reports is:  
 
- Analysis of macro-financial factors and the competitive environment  
- Cash flow analysis 
- Static Liquidity Gap 
- Dynamic Liquidity Gap 
- Liquidity indicators 
- Funding sources 
- Stress scenarios 
- Risk limits analysis and compliance 
 
 
Recommendation 3: FSAPs should use the Terms of Reference for Liquidity Reviews (Annex 
I) and the Questionnaire for Liquidity Reports (Annex II) to request supervisory agencies to 
conduct an adequate assessment of the liquidity management of major banking institutions. The 
FSAP mission might want to review if such plans are in place in systemically important banks 
and if the supervisor is looking at them during inspections or off-site. Crisis simulation 




2.4   Contingency Funding Plan (CFP) 
 
66.  The main purpose of the Contingency Funding Plan (CFP) is to coordinate the response 
of the bank to funding difficulties or a liquidity crisis--to preserve its viability as an on-going 
concern, define a set of actions and funding sources to successfully overcome stress 
environments, and describe external communication policies. From the supervisory point of 
view minimizing negative externalities to other market participants is also an important 
concern. 
 
67.  A CFP is a cash flow projection and comprehensive funding plan that forecasts funding 
needs and funding sources under different market scenarios
56. The degree and sophistication of 
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68.  A sample questionnaire for assessing liquidity risks, prepared by the National Bank of 
Belgium, and a format for liquidity reports required by the OCC are presented in Annex II.  
Annex III shows a possible format for a Contingency Funding Plan (also from the OCC).   
 
69.  The first step in designing a CFP is to define severe but plausible stress scenarios. 
Stress testing allows the bank to analyze liquidity risks based on the performance of different 
liquidity risk drivers and variables under distressed circumstances. The stress testing, therefore, 
allows the bank to define in its CFP the liquidity needs that it may face under stress situations, 
tests the adequacy of liquidity buffers to ensure its ability to meet payments in stressed 
situations, and design the activation of mitigation actions. 
 
70.  The stress testing begins with the construction of scenarios. The scenarios can simulate 
idiosyncratic problems that only affect the entity, systemic problems that affect the banking 
system as a whole, or combinations of the two
58. The construction of the scenarios involves the 
definition of risk events associated with the bank’s activities, products, funding sources, and 
markets. It can also incorporate a historical analysis of the events (when available), and the 
analysis of the impact and risk under each of them. The objective of stress testing is to: 
 
  Detect the vulnerabilities of the bank. 
  Check if the bank’s risk exposure falls within the risk tolerance defined by the 
bank’s Board. 
  Develop an effective CFP which contains the actions and measures to face the 
liquidity problems, under each scenario, based on the nature of the problems, 
probability of occurrence and intensity of shocks. 
 
71.  The liquidity scenarios should not focus only on expected and unexpected cash flows 
but also on asset liquidity, since most institutions rely on generating liquidity from securities 
positions. They should include
59: 
 
  Temporary disruption in liquidity when funding is required only for a short time--for 
example, an operation breakdown, a physical emergency, the withdrawal of a major 
player, etc. 
  Longer term distressed environments: interbank market difficulties, distress in 
specific currencies, tightening credit lines. 
  At least one scenario in which the bank is no longer considered to be investment 
grade. 
  A sudden change in the composition of deposits, a sudden increase in deposit 
withdrawals, the impossibility of selling an asset within a given time horizon 
 
 
72.  The CFP should contain: a definition of the events triggering the plan, a description of 
the potential sources of funding on boththe asset and liability sides, an escalation procedure 
detailing how additional funds could be raised, and a procedure for the management of the plan. 
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Thus, it should address the following elements: 
 
a.  liquidity status 
b.  warning triggers 
c.  funding sources 
d.  actions to take, depending on the severity of the crisis 
e.  functions of the Crisis Management Team  
 
a) The  liquidity status analysis should be quantitatively based on the liquidity indicators 
but it should also qualitative--based on the perception from the market and clients, 
incorporating contractual and behavioral assumptions. 
 
b)  Warning triggers should alert the bank to liquidity problems and be classified based on 
severity: minor, severe or very severe. These alerts allow the bank to recognize not only 
the liquidity risks coming from within, but also those from other counterparts or the 
market. Thus, the bank can identify the actions it needs to put in place when the risks 
occur.  
 
c)  Funding sources. The bank should define the volume and quality of liquid instruments, 
the stand-by lines of credit it has in place, and its access to central bank lending 
programs and other potential liquidity lines. Liquidity risk management should define 
liquidity buffers
60, cash and other unencumbered highly liquid assets that allow the 
institution to meet payments in stressed situations over its defined survival period. 
These liquidity buffers must be regarded as the readily available funding that is not used 
for ongoing business.  
 
  Other potential sources of funding should be diversified and considered for use 
depending on the circumstances or nature of the shock. Some of them could include
61: 
deposit growth, the lengthening of liabilities’ maturities, new issues of short- and long-
term instruments, intra-group fund transfers (within defined regulatory maximum 
exposure limits), the sale of subsidiaries, new capital issues, the sale of repos or highly 
illiquid assets, and borrowing from the central bank (LOLR). 
 
d) The  actions needed to respond to liquidity problems should be a mix of options that take 
into account:  the severity of the problem, its origin, the time horizon being used, the 
bank´s risk profile, and the costs of implementing the action. Some of the remedial 
actions that can be implemented include: 
 
  Use of liquidity buffers: this liquidity cushion should enable the bank to weather 
liquidity stress during its defined survival period, without requiring adjustments 
to its business model. 
  Review of opportunities to increase the size of the liquidity reserve (moving 
assets to more liquid instruments or term borrowing to invest in liquid assets). 
                                                 
60 CEBS, page 12 
61 Basel, BIS Principles, page 19  
 
  Improved collateral management to free additional collateral to be pledged for 
additional funds, eventually moving additional collateral to the central bank. 
  Increasing net cash flow cushions through ALM actions, in the less-than-90-days 
buckets. 
  Review of lines of credit limits to draw liquidity without making lenders even 
more apprehensive (to the point of calling their loans). 
  Restriction on new lending, as much as possible, without triggering a confidence 
crisis. 
  Providing additional incentives and raising interest rates to retain and attract 
more core deposits (without signaling severe distressed borrowing). 
  Tapping alternative funding sources, securitizing assets, selling properties and 
real estate owned by the bank. 
  Potentially transferring funds across subsidiaries, business units. 
  Increased diversification of assets and reducing assets that require funding (that 
is, restructuring the loan portfolio). 
  Replacing credit sensitive liabilities, such as public funds, with more stable, 
credit insensitive funding, such as term retail deposits 
  Reducing concentration by borrower and industry and liabilities (contracting 
unsecured lines of credit, increasing  diversified deposit base). 
  Reducing exposure of funds providers through ‘netting’ agreements.  
  Slow credit growth. 
  Adopting incentives to retain core deposits; more proactive and opportunistic 
funding, exploiting interest rate differentials in the market’s yield curve (agile 
implementation of ALM policies).  
  Changing the composition of securities in the bank’s portfolio in order to reduce 
their average maturity and/or increasing the share of marketable government 
paper.  
  Reducing the number of branches and employees, cutting variable costs (for 
immediate impact) and fixed costs (for delayed impact), etc. 
  As a last resort, accessing the central bank discount window. 
 
e)  The plan should contain the functions of the Crisis Management Team. The Crisis 
Management Team should be responsible for making clear, defined decisions and 
executing measures in a timely manner. It should also be in charge of communications, 
both internal (to the Board and business units) and external (to media and clients), 
besides managing and implementing the CFP effectively. 
 
73.  For banks operating across two or more national jurisdictions, the CFP is additionally 
challenging as cash and collateral are not easily transferable across borders for logistical and 
legal reasons. National regulators are particularly worried about liquidity being transferred 
during liquidity crises; minimum liquidity levels are enforced even during normal times.   
Country risk, foreign exchange and convertibility risks are additional concerns, particularly in 
shallow markets and at times of financial distress.   
 
SECTION 4:  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
74.  The credit crisis of 2007-2008 exposed the negative consequences of mispricing risk 
and poor credit and liquidity risk management in the financial system. It also highlighted the 
danger of ‘linear thinking’--assuming that the future will be the same as the past or present and 
counting on the good times rolling on indefinitely. It also highlighted the major weaknesses in 
the governance of banks and the flaws in their supervisory process. All these elements have 
forced a re-thinking of many of the past assumptions. Liquidity management, in particular, has 
become more important in view of the secular decline in the share of liquid assets in many 
countries and shifts in the banks’ funding activities—with greater reliance on securitizations—
as well as major changes in terms of products, market players, etc. which have vastly increased 
the complexity of banking.  
 
75.  From the perspective of the World Bank and the IMF, the new financial landscape 
requires that some of the earlier approaches and relative emphasis on the FSAPs be revisited, 
with more attention paid to liquidity risks. For example, the current analysis in FSAPs, based 
on rather mechanical and aggregated stress tests, lacks the capacity to assess liquidity risks in 
the banking system of particular countries. Stressing economic indicators in an aggregated way 
does not provide insightful information into the systemic liquidity risks faced by the most 
important banks or the entire financial system. Banks deserving particular attention are those 
with a large market share, significant role in payment systems, high loan-to-deposit ratios, large 
external borrowings, and banks with a concentrated  customer deposit base or high dependence 
on wholesale funding. There might be other criteria, but FSAP missions will need to define 
which banks or other financial market players pose systemic liquidity risks for the countries’ 
financial systems.  
 
76.  Therefore, it becomes pivotal to look closely not only at quantitative indicators (such as 
composition of balance sheet, concentration of assets, types of funds providers, and liquidity 
ratios) but also at qualitative factors (such as behavioral assumptions about depositors’ 
behavior, market outlook, etc.). It is also important to assess the soundness of the liquidity 
management of a country’s banking system—at both the major banks and the tools used by 
supervisory agencies to assess liquidity risks. The latter is essential if the FSAP is to become 
more relevant for stability assessments. As mentioned above, trend and peer analysis for major 
banks will need to become a more integral part of the stability assessment of national banking 
systems. 
 
77.  Recent events have also highlighted that although sound liquidity management is critical 
for protecting protect capital, capital itself may not be an appropriate buffer in a difficult 
liquidity environment. The existence of a robust capital base and a high capital ratio does not 
minimize the importance of liquidity risk. As discussed earlier, insolvent but liquid banks can 
still continue to operate (particularly if they are State-owned), but no single illiquid bank can 
function!. 
 
78.  This Working Paper does not make any claim in terms of ‘originality’; it aims at 
synthesizing disperse information from many sources in order to provide an easy-to-use  
 
reference for staff involved in FSAPs and financial crisis management in the Bank and IMF’s 
client countries. It has an eminent practical approach. A future, longer-term objective is to 
develop a ‘Crisis Management Handbook’ for staff, to serve as a tool for focusing on key risks, 
starting with liquidity risks, in the FSAP missions and other financial sector work (see also 
Annexes). It would be desirable if this compendium could be used by supervisory agencies 
which deal in depth, on a day-to-day basis, with these issues which the FSAPs can only 
superficially assess.  
 
79.  The main lessons of this analysis are: 
  
  First: It is not easy to disentangle the liquidity and solvency problems of banking 
institutions in the presence of asymmetric information. Moreover, this relationship is 
most likely not linear, meaning that even if a bank is insolvent it can continue to 
operate provided it is liquid. As long as the bank’s cashflow remains positive, with 
inflows (a combination of interest income collected, loan amortizations received, 
new deposits collected, other borrowings and liabilities) greater than outflows (a 
combination of interest payments, redemption of deposits, payment of contractual 
liabilities, all operating expenses and taxes), it can continue to operate. This has 
often been the case with insolvent public banks. In a booming economy it is often 
easy for insolvent banks, particularly those with the implicit guarantee of the State, 
to remain liquid for extended periods.  This does not mean that a bank’s capital is 
irrelevant. Clearly, lower capital increases a bank’s vulnerability to any shocks. 
  Second: Funding liquidity risk is inherent to the banking system, as a result of the 
maturity transformation of assets and liabilities that banks undertake in an economy-
- its basic raison d’etre. For this reason, strong liquidity risk management is crucial 
to prevent liquidity crises. On the other hand, market liquidity cannot be taken for 
granted. The impairment of banks’ access to market or the impossibility of selling 
assets at market prices exposes banks to losses and poses liquidity risks for the 
financial system as a whole. Therefore, it is critical to assess the root causes of 
liquidity problems in systemically important individual banks which can initiate a 
systemic liquidity crisis. It is also crucial to assess the contagion channels that can 
spread such distress to other instruments, players and markets. One of the most 
interesting and important suggestions offered to mitigate the liquidity risks have to 
do with the proposal to require additional capital charges for financial institutions 
who hold assets with low market liquidity and long maturity and fund them with 
short-maturity liabilities, as well as new set of accounting rules to “mark-to-
funding” bank assets, valuing assets “not according to the intention of the holder, 
but according to the funding capacity of the holder. … driven by the maturity of the 
funding of the asset”.
62  
  Third: The concentration of funding sources, particularly in the wholesale market, 
can have a significant impact on liquidity risk at a particular bank, as well as 
systemic implications for the entire banking system. Heavy dependence on 
wholesale funding (as in the case of Continental Illinois in the US and Northern 
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Rock in the UK—see Boxes 4  and 5) and a loan concentration in a few sub-sectors 
(for example, energy or housing) exposes banks to unmanageable risks once 
confidence weakens. Banks must diversify their liabilities and increase their reliance 
on less interest and credit-sensitive retail deposits, while diversifying their asset 
base.  
  Fourth: More attention needs to be paid to liquidity planning in the context of 
Contingency Funding Plans by regulatory agencies and FSAPs. In assisting 
countries to prepare or in reviewing contingency plans, WB-IMF staff should look at 
a specific liquidity plan section/content in Aide Memoirs. 
  Fifth: Central bank actions in response to a liquidity crisis should be properly 
tailored to address the specific type of liquidity shortage. The pro-forma review of 
the LOLR facilities done by the IMF in the Transparency of Monetary Policy ROSC 
needs to be complemented with a review of the broader set of topics suggested in 
this Working Paper.  
 
ANNEX I:  TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR LIQUIDITY REVIEWS 
 
 
Objectives and Scope: 
 
The objective of a liquidity review (of an individual bank or a banking system as a whole) is 
to:  
 
(a)  Identify current practices being used by financial institutions to manage their day-to-
day liquidity (in various currencies, different bank units, or entities within a group, 
within different time horizons), with particular attention to internal policies, 
governance aspects, effectiveness of the reporting and monitoring formats (MIS), 
internal controls, and compliance with policies by the different units/group 
institutions. 
  
(b)  Identify risky, as well as best practices to manage liquidity (to be later disseminated 
within the industry and/or to alert the supervisory authorities, design remedial 
measures and required TAs--for individual financial institutions and/or supervisory 
agencies). 
 
(c)  Evaluate the adequacy of contingency plans, sources of liquidity risk, and 
establishment and compliance with risk limits.  
 
(d)  Evaluate the adequacy of stress-testing exercises undertaken by the banks.  
 
(e)  Assess the overall levels of risks being assumed by the banks, with particular 
attention to the sources of liquidity risk and sources of funding for the groups. 
 
(f)  Assess the presence of regulatory impediments to effective liquidity management. 
 
(g)  Assess the central bank temporary liquidity facilities available to banks (Lender of 





The team should be composed of: (a) a liquidity expert as Team Leader; (b) a senior 
experienced commercial banker; (c) a liquidity risk expert with expertise in conducting stress-
testing exercises; (d) a senior bank supervisor; (e) a bank information technology (IT) expert; 








Key Questions to be addressed: 
 
  Governance: 
o  What is the specific role of the Board and the Audit Committee (of the group 
and individual entities) in defining the strategy for liquidity and collateral 
management of the group and its entities? 
o  What is the role of the executive management in liquidity and collateral 
management and what kind of internal controls are set up, again both at group 
level and at the level of the individual entities?  
 
  Determinants and Management of the Bank’s Liquidity Position: 
o  Which bank units are net providers/demanders of liquidity and how does this 
change at different stress levels? By currency? 
o  On a going concern basis, to which transactions, products or activities are the 
principal funding needs of the group related and what are the principal funding 
sources of the group? In this context, in which countries does the group have 
access to central bank money? 
o  How is the group’s access to the market managed in terms of the diversification 
of liabilities, relationships with creditors and the marketability of assets?  
o  What are the group’s key products, contract types and operations that can give 
rise to sudden (unexpected) material demands for liquidity? How, if at all, do 
these sources pose greater liquidity risk today than previously?  
o  Which assets held by the group are particularly vulnerable to loss of market 
liquidity? 
 
  Monitoring Liquidity Position: 
o  How does the group monitor liquidity risk in the products, contracts and 
operations from which unexpected demands for liquidity could emerge? 
o   To what extent are the group’s procedures for the control of liquidity risk linked 
to procedures for the management of other risk types (for example,  reputational 
risk or the market, credit, insurance and operational risks that may result in a 
sudden need for liquidity)? 
o  How are the various proximate sources of liquidity risk mitigated or managed? 
(Exclude from the answer the mitigation of more distant triggering events, such 
as credit, market, insurance, and operational risks.   Include in the answer, how 
the group mitigates the liquidity risk that arises from any options in its liabilities 
and assets.). 
 
  Liquidity Contingency Planning: 
o  Describe the group’s Contingency Funding Plan as regards to liquidity stresses 
at the individual group and market levels. 
o  What are the major mechanisms (borrowing, repurchase agreements, sales of 
assets, securitizations, accelerated payments from obligators to the group, etc.) 
through which the group anticipates accessing liquidity from outside sources 
during stress scenarios?  Over what time frames are such approaches likely to be 
executed?   
 
o  Does the group maintain a single pool of liquidity to be drawn on in stress 
situations, or are there multiple pools in different currencies? What are the 
assumptions underlying the group’s contingency funding plan and the group’s 
plan to monitor the continued validity of those assumptions? 
 
 
  Stress-Testing: INCORPORATE EXAMPLES OF SCENARIOS CONSTRUCTION 
(283 pdf) 
o  Undertaking stress testing naturally involves the metrics that the group has 
adopted for the measurement of liquidity risk. Which types of measures—for 
example, liquid assets on the balance sheet, unencumbered assets that can be 
used to obtain secured funding, and a comparison of cash inflow and outflows 
across a variety of maturity buckets—are paramount in managing the group’s 
liquidity risk?   
o  Where unencumbered assets are involved as collateral for potential borrowings, 
what assumptions are being made? (For example, what assumptions underlie any 
‘haircuts’ that might be made? What assumptions are made about the collateral 
that might be requested by counterparties in a stress situation? How does 
collateral posted for real-time gross settlement and other settlement systems fit 
in the framework?). 
o  What assumptions underlie cash flow projections (for example, assumptions 
about the run-off of assets and liabilities and the intake of new business)? Are 
committed facilities and derivatives included? What type of modeling is done, 
for example, deterministic or probabilistic? 
 
  Regulations & Liquidity: 
o  Legal and regulatory requirements might affect the management of liquidity on a 
group-wide basis.  Do you agree with this view?  Please explain and cite 
specifics wherever possible.  You may want to consider commenting on: 
 
  Whether prudential regulations affect liquidity management more across 
financial sectors (banking, securities, and insurance) or more across 
jurisdictions within sectors. 
  Whether any restrictions on cashflows between affiliates are relevant mostly 
to normal day-to-day operations, to situations of stress, or both. 
  Issues specific to home-host country regulation.  
  
 
ANNEX II:  LIQUIDITY REPORTS 
 
(1)  Questionnaire on Management of Liquidity Risk 
 
This questionnaire is a joint effort by the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (BFIC) 
and the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) to integrate general questions on liquidity and 
collateral management.  The document is meant to provide guidance for a first presentation by 
the management of the large Belgian financial conglomerates in this area of risk management. 
This first presentation will be attended by both BFIC and NBB staff members--in the context of 
the joint interest of banking supervisors and central banks in liquidity and collateral 
management practices—and, thus, in order not to duplicate the groups’ efforts.  Both the BFIC 
and NBB will, on an individual basis and each within their own field of competence, touch 
upon more specific central bank and supervisory issues at a later stage.   
 
The questionnaire is based on a survey on liquidity management in cross-sector and cross-
border financial groups, and has been prepared by a working group of the Joint Forum 
(international forum of bank, securities and insurance supervisors). The questionnaire 
encompasses five building blocks: the group’s and individual entities of the group’s collateral 
and liquidity management practices, the sources of liquidity risk and sources of funding for the 
group, contingency funding plans, the group’s experience in terms of liquidity stress-testing, 
and a final set of questions regarding regulatory considerations. We would appreciate it if a 
short written reply to this questionnaire could be provided in the context of the presentation.  
The reply to this questionnaire will be treated as a confidential document within the BFIC and 
the NBB.  A part of the reply to this questionnaire will nevertheless be used –anonymously--in 
the context of the Joint Forum study.    
 
1.  Liquidity risk and collateral management within financial groups.   
 
One question of interest to global supervisors is: How do liquidity strains spread within 
financial groups?  This question, in turn, leads to other questions on how liquidity is managed 
at the group level versus subsidiary levels.    
 
1.1  How are liquidity and collateral management implemented at the group level and at the 
level of different entities? While determining the extent of centralization of liquidity risk 
management within financial groups in mind, please outline the structure of the group with 
respect to the management of liquidity and collateral.  Which divisions play an essential role in 
liquidity and collateral management and what are their respective roles? We are particularly 
interested in the roles played by a central unit and those played by subsidiaries and other 
business units located both in the home country and in foreign countries, with respect to:  
 
  Managing cash and collateral on a day-to-day basis 
  Establishing risk limits 
  Monitoring liquidity positions against limits 
  Identifying sources of liquidity risk 
  Maintaining creditor relationships  
 
  Creating a contingency funding plan 
  Managing stress situations 
 
1.2  In addition, what is the specific role of the Board and the audit committee (of the group 
and individual entities) in defining the strategy for liquidity and collateral management of the 
group and its entities? Along the same lines, what is the role of the executive management in 
liquidity and collateral management and what kind of internal controls are set up, again both at 
group level and at the level of the individual entities? Was an analysis of the procedures and 
internal controls, with respect to (segments of) the liquidity and collateral management of the 
group, incorporated into the recent internal audit cycles?  
 
1.3  To what extent is information on the liquidity and collateral management publicly 
disclosed to market participants, creditors and the general public?  
 
1.4  For those groups that are materially engaged in more than one financial sector (banking, 
securities and insurance), how does the group integrate (if it does) the sector-specific liquidity 
concerns and risk management methodologies?  
 
1.5  How are the group’s policies and procedures influenced by its technological capability 
to aggregate liquidity information across business and geographical units? Does the 
management information system enable a global measurement and monitoring of net funding 
requirements and limits set in the context of collateral and liquidity management? 
 
1.6  Where, inside the group, does management visualize liquidity strains as most likely to 
emerge?   
 
1.7  Does the group’s liquidity policy address the possibility that liquidity pressures would 
spread between the component business units within the group or the geographical areas in 
which it operates? If so, by what means are the pressures visualized to spread and how does the 
policy address them? 
 
1.8  How is the size of limits at the group level determined and allocated to subsidiaries or 
other operating units? Are these limits based on cumulative cash flow mismatches or on the 
coverage of short-term liabilities by liquid assets etc.? 
 
 
2.  Sources of liquidity risk/Sources of funding 
 
One of the issues is whether liquidity risk for complex financial groups has changed or 
increased in recent years and, if so, how. 
 
Products and obligations 
 
2.1  On an going concern basis, to which transactions, products or activities are the principal 
funding needs of the group related and what are the principal funding sources of the group? In 
this context, in which countries does the group have access to central bank money?  
 
 
2.2  How is the group’s access to the market managed in terms of the diversification of 
liabilities, relationships with creditors and the marketability of assets?  
 
2.3  What do you see as the group’s key products, contract types and operations that can 
give rise to sudden (unexpected) material demands for liquidity
63? How, if at all, do these 
sources pose greater liquidity risk today than previously?   
 
2.4  How does the group monitor liquidity risk in the products, contracts and operations 
from which unexpected demands for liquidity could emerge? 
 
2.5  Which assets held by the group do you consider particularly vulnerable to loss of market 
liquidity? 
 
2.6  To what extent are the group’s procedures for the control of liquidity risk linked to 
procedures for the management of other risk types (for example, reputational risk or the market, 
credit, insurance and operational risks that may result in a sudden need for liquidity)? 
 
2.7  How are the various proximate sources of liquidity risk mitigated or managed?   
(Exclude from your answer the mitigation of more distant triggering events, such as credit, 
market, insurance and operational risks.  But please include how your group mitigates the 
liquidity risk that arises from any options in its liabilities and assets.) 
 
Cross-currency and cross-jurisdictional funds transfers 
 
2.8  What are the main liquidity needs and funding sources of the group in currencies other 
than the home country’s currency? To what extent does the group view cross-currency funds 
transfers as an important source of liquidity risk? How does this component of liquidity risk 
enter into its management framework? 
 
2.9  To what extent does the group view cross-sector (intra-group or inter-affiliate) funds 
transfers as a source of liquidity risk/source of funding? 
 
 
3.  Contingency funding plans 
 
This section focuses on the availability of and demand for liquidity in stress situations.    
 
3.1  Please describe the group’s Contingency Funding Plan with respect to liquidity stresses 
at the individual, group and the market levels.   
 
                                                 
63 Please consider the full range of possibilities, including transactions that incorporate ratings triggers, market 
movements that entail increasing collateralization requirements, and insurance policy payouts at market values in 
excess of the values recorded in the company’s books. Also consider, more traditional contracts like commercial 
paper, inter-bank borrowings, sight deposits, and insurance policies resulting in large claims. 
  
 
  Among other things, please indicate the extent to which the group expects to rely on 
outside parties (either governmental/central bank or private) in the event of stress. 
To what extent would group entities rely on the parent or affiliates for liquidity 
support in times of stress? In this context, does the Contingency Funding Plan 
incorporate potential liquidity transfers between bank, insurance and investment 
entities of the group? How does that differ from the inter-affiliate dependencies in 
normal times? 
  Do group entities also develop their own Contingency Funding Plans? 
 
3.2  What factors would trigger the implementation of the Contingency Funding Plan? Who 
makes the decision to initiate the Plan?  
 
3.3  To what extent was the group’s contingency plan influenced by regulatory or 
supervisory requirements (see also questions on regulatory considerations in the final section of 
this questionnaire)? 
 
3.4  If the group offers or is engaged in large-volume payments and securities settlement and 
clearing services, how do the needs for intra-day liquidity and end-of-day liquidity combine in 
the group’s Contingency Funding Plan?  Likewise, how are the group’s global custody 
activities, if any, reflected in the Plan? 
 
3.5  What are the major mechanisms (borrowing, repurchase agreements, sales of assets, 
securitizations, accelerated payments from obligators to the group, etc.) through which the 
group anticipates accessing liquidity from outside sources during stress scenarios?  Over what 
timeframes are such approaches likely to be executed?   
 
3.6  Does the group maintain a single pool of liquidity to be drawn on in stress situations, or 
are there multiple pools in different currencies? 
 
3.7  Please describe the key ways in which corporate units within a group would obtain 
liquidity from parents and affiliates in a stress situation. What are the specific policies? 
 
3.8  How does the plan reflect cross-jurisdictional and cross-currency movements of funds 
and collateral? At what level of the enterprise are these movements reflected? 
 
3.9  We would also like to understand the assumptions underlying the group’s Contingency 
Funding Plan and the group’s plan to monitor the continued validity of those assumptions.  Can 
you indicate the assumptions and the monitoring, if any? (For example, what assumptions are 
made about the availability of funding from outside sources and the stability of the marketplace 
in which that funding would be raised? What assumptions are made about the duration of a 
liquidity crisis?)  
 
3.10  Does the group periodically test access to funding lines? More generally, does the group 
conduct exercises testing the effectiveness of its Contingency Funding Plan? 
  
 
3.11  Have you had to initiate any part of your Contingency Funding Plan at any time over the 
past ten years or so?  More generally, have the experiences of your group--due either to firm-
specific or market-wide stresses--led to any ‘lessons learned’ regarding the management of 
liquidity during such episodes? 
 
4.  Stress testing 
 
This section investigates the kinds of liquidity stress events that complex groups seek to prepare 
for and how they assess their capacity to handle such stress events. 
 
4.1  The undertaking of stress testing naturally involves the metrics that the group has 
adopted for the measurement of liquidity risk. First, please indicate which types of measures—
for example, liquid assets on the balance sheet, unencumbered assets that can be used to obtain 
secured funding, and a comparison of cash inflow and outflows across a variety of maturity 
buckets—are paramount in managing the group’s liquidity risk? 
 
  Where unencumbered assets are involved as collateral for potential borrowings, 
what assumptions are being made? (For example, what assumptions underlie any 
‘haircuts’ that might be made? What assumptions are made about the collateral that 
might be requested by counterparties in a stress situation? How does collateral 
posted for real-time gross settlement and other settlement systems fit in the 
framework?) 
 
  What assumptions underlie cash flow projections (for example, assumptions about 
the run-off of assets and liabilities and the intake of new business)? Are committed 




  What factors are used to determine the limits on exposures to liquidity risk accepted 
by the group? 
 
  Some firms also use a measure that indicates the length of time that the firm can 
continue (normal or limited) operations before it becomes unable to meet an 
obligation when due.  Does your group use such a measure? If so, would you please 
describe it, indicating (among other things) the expectations for what might happen 
during this time period and how (if at all) the assumptions discussed above would 
change? 
 
4.2  We would like to learn more about the group’s stress testing. Please describe in some 
detail the stress scenarios that your group uses to assess its capacity to withstand funding 
liquidity pressures.  We would be interested in, among other things: 
 
                                                 
64 A deterministic model is one that assumes that there is only one possible outcome.  A probabilistic model is one 
that recognizes that a range of outcomes is possible and assigns probabilities to input and/or output factors.  
 
  The extent to which the funding liquidity stress tests include firm-specific or general 
market shocks 
  Whether the scenarios pertain to the group as a whole or if there are separate 
simulations for the various business units or legal jurisdictions 
  An indication of how severe the scenarios are; the assumptions made (including, 
among other things, the behavior of inflows and outflows, the take-up of options that 
give counterparties the right to withdraw funds immediately, the availability of 
secured and unsecured funding, haircuts on collateral, and the correlation of 
liquidity shocks across business units) 
  The time horizon used 
  The extent to which the liquidity stress tests are integrated with those for other types 
of risks (for example, market, credit, insurance, and operational risks) 
  The frequency with which liquidity stress testing is done 
  When various units perform their own assessments, how consistent are the 
assumptions used by the various units 
 
4.3  Could you tell us how the results of stress testing are incorporated in the group’s limits 
on exposures to liquidity risk and its contingency plans? 
 
5.  Regulatory considerations 
 
5.1  Legal and regulatory requirements might affect the management of liquidity on a group-
wide basis. Do you agree with this view? Please explain and cite specifics wherever possible.  
You may want to consider commenting on: 
 
  Whether prudential regulations affect liquidity management more across financial 
sectors (banking, securities, and insurance) or more across jurisdictions within 
sectors 
  Whether any restrictions on cash flows between affiliates are relevant mostly to 
normal day-to-day operations, to situations of stress, or both 
  Issues specific to home-host country regulation  
 
5.2  A particular issue is that present prudential regulations pose challenges to the 
centralization of liquidity management. Do you see this as an issue? If yes, to which prudential 
regulations on liquidity is the group subject in countries outside the home country, and in which 
way do these regulations affect the (centralized or decentralized) liquidity management in the 
head office? In this connection, how has the extent of central control in your group evolved 
over the past several years? What benefits has the group realized (or expect to realize) from 
greater central management of liquidity?  
 
5.3  Do you see any tension between the objective of consumer protection (for example, for 
long-term life insurance policyholders) and the desire to manage liquidity centrally across the 




5.4  Can you suggest a few changes in law or regulation that you believe would facilitate the 
group’s management of liquidity? 
 
5.5  In particular, how would the group’s liquidity management and liquidity posture change 
if regulators relaxed some of the restrictions on the movement of funds between affiliates 




(2) OCC Liquidity Report 
APPENDIX A:  FUNDS FLOW ANALYSIS OF THE ABC BANK 
FOR SELECTED ASSETS AND CREDIT SENSITIVE LIABILITIES $ THOUSANDS 
 
Sample Format, tailor 








  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (10)  (9)  (11)  (12) 
Quarter  Federal  Total    Money  DOA        Other    
  Reserve  Loans &  Free  Market  Net of  Consumer  Fed Funds  COs  Foreign  Sensitive  Short‐Term  Short‐Term 
  Balance  Leases  Securities  Assets  Float  Deposits  Purchased  >$100m  Deposits  Funds/Dep  Assets  Liabs 
                     
1  $5,000  $310,000  $70,000  $7,500  $96,000  $389,000  $10,000  $40,350  $0  $0  $10,000  $8,500 
2  $5,000  $320,000  $68,000  $7,500  $94,000  $384,000  $10,000  $42,000  $1,000  $1,000  $10,000  $8,500 
3  $5,200  $325,000  $66,500  $6,800  $94,000  $383,000  $12,000  $43,000  $1,000  $2,200  $10,000  $8,500 
4  $5,100  $330,000  $67,500  $5,500  $92,400  $384,000  $14,500  $44,000  $1,000  $3,800  $10,000  $8,500 
5  $5,000  $345,000  $68,000  $5,000  $90,400  $383,900  $13,000  $47,400  $1,000  $4,000  $10,000  $8,500 
6  $4,800  $396,000  $23,200  $5,000  $74,000  $377,000  $10,000  $50,500  $1,000  $5,500  $10,000  $8,500 
7  $5,100  $455,500  $19,000  $4,000  $75,300  $370,000  $11,000  $51,000  $2,700  $7,500  $6,000  $4,500 
8  $3,900  $473,000  $12,500  $2,000  $80,000  $365,000  $14,000  $51,100  $5,000  $10,400  $4,500  $3,000 
               
Change from               








NOTE: Sources and Uses do not balance on this schedule as it purposely includes only balance sheet line items likely to affect liquidity.  Longer term 
assets/liabilities, such as fixed assets or other liabilities, which usually two Iiule impact art liquidity, are excluded in order to locos on meaningful cash (laws.  The 
out at balance condition can be monitored and controlled, and 7 significant should be researched This process allows for a more timely availability and 
presentation of data. 
Sources and Uses Quarter 7 to Quarter B
Sources Uses 
FRB BALANCE  $1,200  LOANS & LEASES  $17,50
0 FREE  $6,500  CONSUMER DEP  $5 ADO 
MMA $  2,000   
DOA $4,700    $22,50
F FP  $ 3,000     
CDs $100     
FOREIGN DEP  $2,300    
OTHER 41AB5  -$2,900 
  
  $22,700  
 
2  3 .  /  S 8 
Quasar 
-Lnam ®Comumor  Funding  i 
Wholesale Funding 
 Foreign Deposits  ® Fed Fonda Purchased 
 CDs>$100M DGtlt  Sen  Funds   56 
Appendix A:  Continued Funds Flow Analysis Sample Line Item Definitions 
 
Most of the line item definitions can be modified by the bank to clarify individual bank reports, 
but there are certain exceptions, as noted. 
Bank Assets 
(Note: Include ONLY bank balances, NOT nonbank subsidiaries) 
(1)  Federal Reserve Balance 
  The sum of Federal Reserve due from bank balances. 
(2)  Total Loans and Leases 
  The sum of gross loans plus other real estate owned. 
(3)  Free Securities 
  This term is strictly limited to securities meeting the following characteristics: 
saleable securities held, securities available for pledging, unpledged securities in 
transit, and assets securitized. These securities are not encumbered in any way and 
are of sufficient unit/transaction size and credit quality to be repurchased or sold in 
the market at will.  Book value rather than market value is acceptable. 
  An accurate number for ‘free securities’ is not typically available from the 
general ledger.  Management's judgment is required to arrive at a representative 
figure in accordance with the definition provided. Various methods may be used, 
but should be subject to periodic testing to ensure reasonable accuracy. 
(4)  Money Market Assets 
  This term is limited strictly to the following instruments held externally in non-
affiliated banks. No variance in the definition of ‘money market assets’ is 
allowed.  Additional columns may be added, if necessary, to provide an accurate 
portrayal of other liquid assets. 
  Federal funds sold, both overnight and term (do not include Repos)  
 Negotiable  CDs  purchased 
  Foreign deposits placed, both overnight and term (Euro-dollar and other foreign 
currencies)   57 
Bank Liabilities 
(Note: Include ONLY bank balances, NOT non-bank subsidiaries) 
(5)  DDA Net of Float 
Total demand deposit ledger balances, net of due from banks-deferred, due from 
Fed-deferred, and ‘other’ cash items, such as items in process. 
(6)  Consumer Deposits 
Separate consumer accounts, which exceed $100m, if significant. The line (does 
not include DDA, which is reported separately) should reflect consumer deposits, 
such as: 
NOW accounts. 
Money market checking accounts. 
Non-transaction accounts, interest or non-interest bearing.   
CDs < $ 100m (net of public funds). 
Passbook savings. 
Money market savings. 
IRA and Keogh accounts. 
(7)  Federal Funds Purchased — Overnight 
The sum of Fed funds purchased as principal on an overnight basis. 
(8)  Fed Funds Purchased — Term 
The sum of Fed funds purchased as principal for a term longer than overnight. 
(9)  Foreign Deposits — Overnight 
All Eurodollars and foreign currency accepted as foreign branch liabilities on an 
overnight basis. Report retail deposits separate from wholesale or professional 
funds providers, if significant. 
(10)  Foreign Deposits — Term 
All Eurodollars and foreign currency accepted as foreign branch deposits for a 
term longer than overnight. Report retail deposits separate from wholesale or 
professional funds providers, if significant. 
(11)  CDs >$100m 
Total balance of jumbo CDs (net of investment agreements and public funds).  This 
category could include deposit notes, or other similar liabilities, if they are in 
excess of 
$100m.  Include the entire deposit if it is greater than $100m, but not deposits that 
are less than or equal to $100m if possible, based on MIS availability. 
Note: For potential erosion estimates, it is best to assume that an entire deposit   58 
which exceeds $100m will leave the bank rather than the amount in excess of 
$100m.  However, for identification of uninsured deposits for FDIC purposes, 
only the amount of each deposit exceeding $100m is technically uninsured. 
(12)  Other Sensitive Funds/Deposits 
Total of all funding sources that may exhibit unusual credit sensitivity that are 
not already defined. 
(13)  Treasury, Tax, and Loan 
The sum of the Treasury, tax, and loan balances. 
(14)  Fed Discount Window 
Total borrowings at the discount window. 
 
Non-bank Assets (Parent) 
(15)  Short-Term Internal Investments 
Foreign deposits placed (from parent's 
perspective). Other short-term liquid assets. 
Note: Typically, these parent company assets are placed in affiliated bank liability 
accounts, such as foreign deposits taken and, therefore, are also reflected on the 
bank's asset side--presumably in money market assets. An understanding of how 
these funds flow from the parent to affiliate and back is critical in an analysis of the 
Funds Flow Analysis report to avoid double counting.  It must be assumed that the 
bank's liabilities to the parent will have priority on the bank's liquid assets. 
Therefore, for analysis purposes, they must be subtracted from the money market 
asset number for an assessment of bank level liquidity. 
(16)  Short-Term External Assets: Cash, foreign deposits 
placed, other short-term liquid assets. 
Note: Ensure that these assets are not carried in the ‘consolidated’ Funds Flow 
Analysis MMA figure (4).  They represent liquid assets the parent maintains 
outside of its own corporation and are available to the parent over the listed total 
MMA figure in the Funds Flow Analysis Report. 
 
Non-Bank Liabilities (Parent) 
(17)  Commercial Paper, etc. 
Total commercial paper issued by the parent company or subsidiary, master notes, 
and any other short-term liability, including term debt or debt payments that are 
approaching maturity.   59
APPENDIX B:  CONTINGENCY FUNDING PLAN SUMMARY 




PROVIDERS (from list) 
FED FUNDS 
CDs 




OTHER UNINSURED FUND 
PROVIDERS FED FUNDS 
CDs 





















TOTAL OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS 
TOTAL POTENTIAL FUNDING EROSION 
SOURCES OF FUNDS TO MEET DEMANDS 
(WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE UTILIZED, DEPENDING ON NEED) 
(ASSUMING NEEDED ASAP)   60
IMMEDIATE 30 DAYS  60 DAYS  90 DAYS










TOTAL INTERNAL SOURCES 
ESTIMATED LINE CAPACITY TO 
BORROW IN MARKET 
BROKERED FUNDS CAPACITY 




APPENDIX C:  LIQUIDITY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 
(Note: The forms referred to in this list are included in the OCC MIS liquidity monitoring 
package.  They are only samples or ideas.  Tailor reports to fit your specific needs.) 
Daily Bank Information Needs 
  Management should contact examiners immediately if significant activity occurs in the 
market or deterioration of any kind occurs throughout the day. 
  Press articles, potentially damaging media, applicable Dow reports, and other 
pertinent information received over the wire—throughout the day. 
  Wire room activity report—daily and periodically as appropriate. 
  Daylight OD numbers. 
  Stock quote. 
  CD rate survey. 
  Funds Flow Analysis (see form). 
  Fed funds summary (see form). 
  Net intercompany funding positions report (see form). 
  Total deposit trends report (see form). 
  Damage assessment report (see form). 
  Summary balance sheets on all banks and affiliates. 
  Sources and uses analysis (see form). 
  Meet with examiners to discuss reports. 
  Close of business estimates (see form).   
 
Daily Examiner Requirements 
 
  Management should contact examiners immediately, if significant activity occurs in the 
market or deterioration of any kind occurs throughout the day. 
  Press articles, potentially damaging media, applicable Dow reports, and other 
pertinent information received over the wire—throughout the day.  +  
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  Wire room activity report—daily and periodically, as appropriate.  ** 
  Daylight OD numbers. 
  Stock quote. 
  CD rate survey.  # 
  Funds flow analysis (see form).  + 
  Fed funds summary (see form).  + 
  Net intercompany funding positions report (see form).  **, + 
  Total deposit trends (see form).  + 
  Damage assessment reports (see form).  **, + 
  Summary balance sheets on all banks and affiliates.  ** 
  Meet with management to discuss reports.  ** 
  Prepare daily e-mail.  + 
  Sources and uses analysis (see form). 
  Narrative of (1) sources and uses analysis and (2) any important events. 
o  Close of business estimates.   
o  Unfunded commitment report ** 
o  Maturities report 
o  Consolidated maturities summary + 
  Summary lead banks balance sheets with significant changes explained ** 
  Due from/to correspondent bank summary ** 
  Trust balance (secured portion) ** 
  ALCO packet 
  Fed discount window collateral (see form) + 
  TT&L collateral (see form) + 
  Attend bank ALCO **  
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  Loan sales report (may be in ALCO Packet) 
  Parent company weekly cash flow + 
  Top 20 customer analysis (consolidated) 
  Jumbo CD rates comparisons + 
 
 
# Monthly - until conditions exist that adversely threaten the company's funding position. 
** Needed only when bank is under examination or conditions exist that would affect the 




APPENDIX D:  CONTINGENCY LIQUIDITY PLAN (OCC) 
 
 
CONTINGENCY FUNDING PLAN SUMMARY 
(Example format, tailor as appropriate) 
POTENTIAL FUNDING
EROSION 
LARGE FUND PROVIDERS 
(from list) FED FUNDS 
CDs 




OTHER UNINSURED FUND 
PROVIDERS FED FUNDS 
CDs 






















TOTAL OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS 
TOTAL POTENTIAL FUNDING EROSION 
SOURCES OF FUNDS TO MEET DEMANDS 
(WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE UTILIZED, DEPENDING ON NEED) 
(ASSUMING NEEDED ASAP)  
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IMMEDIATE 30 DAYS  60 DAYS  90  DAYS
 180+  DAYS 
SURPLUS MONEY MARKET 
ASSETS FREE 
SECURITIES 






TOTAL INTERNAL SOURCES 
ESTIMATED LINE CAPACITY TO 
BORROW IN MARKET BROKERED 
FUNDS CAPACITY 




ANNEX III:  BIS PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 
 
Fundamental principles for the management and supervision of liquidity risk  
Principle 1: A bank is responsible for the sound management of liquidity risk. A bank 
should establish a robust liquidity risk management framework that ensures it maintains 
sufficient liquidity, including a cushion of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets, to 
withstand a range of stress events, including those involving the loss or impairment of both 
unsecured and secured funding sources. Supervisors should assess the adequacy of both a 
bank's liquidity risk management framework and its liquidity position and should take 
prompt action if a bank is deficient in either area in order to protect depositors and to limit 
potential damage to the financial system.  
Governance of liquidity risk management 
Principle 2: A bank should clearly articulate a liquidity risk tolerance that is appropriate for 
its business strategy and its role in the financial system.  
Principle 3: Senior management should develop a strategy, policies and practices to manage 
liquidity risk in accordance with the risk tolerance and to ensure that the bank maintains 
sufficient liquidity. Senior management should continuously review information on the 
bank’s liquidity developments and report to the Board of Directors on a regular basis. A 
bank’s Board of Directors should review and approve the strategy, policies and practices 
related to the management of liquidity at least annually, and ensure that senior management 
manages liquidity risk effectively.  
Principle 4: A bank should incorporate liquidity costs, benefits and risks in the product 
pricing, performance measurement and new product approval processes for all significant 
business activities (both on- and off-balance sheet), thereby aligning the risk-taking 
incentives of individual business lines with the liquidity risk exposures their activities create 
for the bank as a whole.  
Measurement and management of liquidity risk  
Principle 5: A bank should have sound processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring, 
and controlling liquidity risk. These processes should include a robust framework for 
comprehensively projecting cash flows arising from assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet 
items over an appropriate set of time horizons.  
Principle 6:  A bank should actively manage liquidity risk exposures and funding needs 
within and across legal entities, business lines and currencies, taking into account legal, 
regulatory and operational limitations to the transferability of liquidity.  
Principle 7: A bank should establish a funding strategy that provides effective diversification 
in the sources and tenor of funding. It should maintain an ongoing presence in its chosen 
funding markets and strong relationships with funds providers to promote effective 
diversification of funding sources. A bank should regularly gauge its capacity to raise funds 
quickly from each source. It should identify the main factors that affect its ability to raise  
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funds and monitor those factors closely to ensure that estimates of fund raising capacity 
remain valid.  
Principle 8: A bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet 
payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis, under both normal and stressed 
conditions, and thus contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems.  
Principle 9: A bank should actively manage its collateral positions, differentiating between 
encumbered and unencumbered assets. A bank should monitor the legal entity and physical 
location where collateral is held and how it may be mobilized in a timely manner.  
Principle 10: A bank should conduct stress tests on a regular basis for a variety of 
institution-specific and market-wide stress scenarios (individually and in combination) to 
identify sources of potential liquidity strain and to ensure that current exposures remain in 
accordance with a bank’s established liquidity risk tolerance. A bank should use stress test 
outcomes to adjust its liquidity risk management strategies, policies, and positions and to 
develop effective contingency plans.  
Principle 11: A bank should have a formal Contingency Funding Plan (CFP) that clearly sets 
out the strategies for addressing liquidity shortfalls in emergency situations. A CFP should 
outline policies to manage a range of stress environments, establish clear lines of 
responsibility, include clear invocation and escalation procedures, and be regularly tested and 
updated to ensure that it is operationally robust.  
Principle 12: A bank should maintain a cushion of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets 
to be held as insurance against a range of liquidity stress scenarios, including those that 
involve the loss or impairment of unsecured and typically available secured funding sources. 
There should be no legal, regulatory or operational impediment to using these assets to obtain 
funding.  
Public disclosure 
Principle 13: A bank should publicly disclose information on a regular basis that enables 
market participants to make an informed judgment about the soundness of its liquidity risk 
management framework and liquidity position.  
The role of supervisors 
Principle 14: Supervisors should regularly perform a comprehensive assessment of a bank’s 
overall liquidity risk management framework and liquidity position to determine whether 
they deliver an adequate level of resilience to liquidity stress given the bank’s role in the 
financial system.  
Principle 15: Supervisors should supplement their regular assessments of a bank’s liquidity 
risk management framework and liquidity position by monitoring a combination of internal 
reports, prudential reports and market information.   
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Principle 16: Supervisors should intervene to require effective and timely remedial action by 
a bank to address deficiencies in its liquidity risk management processes or liquidity position.  
Principle 17: Supervisors should communicate with other supervisors and public authorities, 
such as central banks, both within and across national borders, to facilitate effective 
cooperation regarding the supervision and oversight of liquidity risk management. 
Communication should occur regularly during normal times, with the nature and frequency 
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